JAMES ROCHA RODRIGUES DE MELO

WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST: STREET-LEVEL POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AT THE VIVA VIDA CENTERS OF THE SOUTH EAST MACRO-REGION - MG

Dissertação apresentada à Universidade Federal de Viçosa, como parte das exigências do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração, para obtenção do título de *Magister Scientiae*.

Orientador: Josiel Lopes Valadares

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RESUMO

MELO, James Rocha Rodrigues de, M.Sc., Universidade Federal de Viçosa, agosto de 2021. **Women And Children First: Street-Level Policy Entrepreneurship At The Viva Vida Centers Of The South East Macro-Region - MG**. Orientador: Josiel Lopes Valadares

A literatura sobre empreendedores políticos tem se concentrado principalmente nos tomadores de decisões de alto nível, ignorando os burocratas de nível baixo e médio. Entretanto, à luz de sua posição próxima aos cidadãos e da natureza da atividade, alguns trabalhos recentes têm vinculado os burocratas de nível de rua (SLBs) ao empreendedorismo político. Eles destacam o uso de estratégias empreendedoras pelos SLBs para influenciar a política através de práticas de implementação e/ou desenho de políticas. Imersos em uma ampla rede que fornece serviços de saúde para crianças e mulheres em todos os três níveis de assistência à saúde, os SLBs dos Centros Viva Vida (CVV) estão em um contexto muito semelhante aos comumente abordados na literaura Assim, este trabalho teve como objetivo principal investigar o engajamento dos SLBs dentro da CVV Viçosa e Manhuaçu em estratégias empreendedoras para moldar a política através de práticas de implementação e/ou influenciar diretamente o desenho de políticas. A coleta dos dados foi realizada por meio de entrevistas semiestruturadas com os burocratas dos CVVs Manhuaçu e Viçosa. Os resultados relatam o caso da ex-gerente da CVV Manhuaçu (I3). O caso é cronologicamente dividido em dois momentos distintos, considerando a literatura de policy process. No primeiro momento, I3, gerente do CVV Manhuaçu de 2010 a 2017, motivada pela falta de orientação para a implementação e um alto nível de discricionariedade, detectou problemas, planejou processos, difundiu sua visão e liderou ativamente sua equipe, delineando com sucesso o protótipo do Centro, assegurando uma implementação tranquila através de estratégias de consolidação. Anos mais tarde, quando uma mudança top-down na política foi implementada, deixando centenas de pessoas sem assistência, ela agiu para reinserir a questão da violência sexual e das vítimas de abuso na agenda oficial do governo, com o objetivo de promover mudanças políticas no nível istituciinal. Argumenta-se que o uso de estratégias empreededoras pode aumentar as chances de sucesso dos burocratas de rua em influenciar as políticas, portanto é importante promover a proatividade na burocracia de rua, e colocar ao seu alcance instrumentos políticos e de governança para a participação política, uma vez que apenas traços pessoais favoráveis podem não ser suficientes.

Palavras-chave: Empreendedorismo. Empreendorismo de políticas. Burocracia de nível de rua. Empreendedorismo de nível de rua. Policy process. Policy change.

ABSTRACT

Melo, James Rocha Rodrigues de, M.Sc., Universidade Federal de Viçosa, August, 2021. **Women And Children First: Street-Level Policy Entrepreneurship At The Viva Vida Centers Of The South East Macro-Region - MG**. Adviser: Josiel Lopes Valadares

The literature on policy entrepreneurs has mainly focused on high-level decision-makers, ignoring low and middle-level bureaucrats. However, in light of their close position to citizens and the nature of activity, some recent works have been linking street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) with policy entrepreneurship. They highlight the use of entrepreneurial strategies by SLBs to influence policy via implementation practices and/or policy design. Immersed in a broad network that provides health services to children and women in all three levels of health assistance, Viva Vida Centers' (CVV) SLBs are in a very similar context to those normally approached in literature. Thus, this works main objective was to investigate the engagement of SLBs within CVVs Viçosa and Manhuaçu in entrepreneurial strategies to shape policy through implementation practices and/or directly influence policy design. Data collection was carried out through semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats Cvvs Viçosa and Manhuaçu. The results report the case of CVV Manhuaçu's former manager (I3). The case is chronologically divided into two distinct moments, considering the policy process literature. In the first moment, the manager of CVV Manhuaçu from 2010 to 2017, prompted by a lack of guidance for implementation and a high level of discretion, framed problems, planned processes, diffused her vision and actively led her team, successfully outlining the Center's prototype, securing smooth implementation through consolidating strategies. Years later, when when a top-down change in policy struck, leaving hundreds unassisted, she ultimately acted to reinsert the issue of sexual violence and abuse victims into the official government agenda, aiming to promote policy change at the isntituciinal level. It is argued that the use of entrepreneurial strategies can increase the chances of success for street-level bureaucrats in influencing policy outcomes, thus it is important to promote proactivity among the street-level bureaucracy, and place at their reach, political and governance instruments for political participation, once just favorable personal traits might not enough sometimes.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship. Policy Entrepreneruship. Street-level bureaucracy. Street-level policy entrepreneurship. Policy process. Policy change.

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ABBREVIATIONS INDEX

CEAE – Centro Estaudal de Atenção Especializada

CF/88 – Federal Constitution of 1988

CMPOMFI - Comitê Municipal de Prevenção do Óbito Materno, Fetal e Infantil

CMR – Child Mortality Rate

CVV – Centros Viva Vida

MMR – Maternal Mortality Rate

PAHO – Pan American Health Organization

PMDI – Plano Mineiro de Desenvolvimento Integrado

SLB – Street-Level Bureaucrat

SLM- Street-Level Manager

SLPE – Street-Level Policy Entrepreneurship

SUS – Sistema de Saúde Unificado (Unified Health System)

WHO – World Health Organization

SUMMARY

1 INTRODUCTION

Deriving from the French word *entreprendre* that in the Middle Ages labeled individuals that were active and could get things done (HOZELITZ, 1951), the “entrepreneur” has followed a dynamic path since then. Within and outside the economic field, outstanding works have been produced on entrepreneurship. From pieces of work that dedicated themselves to study of the entrepreneurial profile to those that shed light on its practical impact in the economic system, such activity has been tied to some key concepts, such as risk, uncertainty, alertness, innovation, motivation, charisma, and need for achievement (KNIGHT, 1921; KIRZNER; 1973; SCHUMPETER; 1934; WEBER, 1930; McCLELLAND; 1961).

Even though emerging in the context of highly competitive market-oriented economies as a valuable surviving strategy, entrepreneurship crossed the line from the private sphere to the public one. First as an incipient idea within the public sector in the early 1960s (OSTROM; 1964; OLSON; 1965), it was not until the 1980s that entrepreneurship walked into the public sphere through the front door. Under the neoliberal discourse that took over the decade, entrepreneurship became part of the managerialism discourse, legitimizing a commercial public service that defines itself as anti-bureaucracy, innovate and risk taking (EDWARDS *et al.;*2002).

Aside from the role of entrepreneurship in building and improving public organizations, the idea spilled over to the political sciences. In the 1980s, John Kingdon weaved the concept of the policy entrepreneur to understand the political agenda-setting inside the United States Federal Government. Acting inside the scope of the Multiple Streams, policy entrepreneurs are defined by Kingdon (2003) as individuals that invest their resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems, not only prompting important people to pay attention but also for coupling solutions to problems and coupling problems and solutions to politics.

As agents who aim to generate change through policies that are new to the government (MINTRON, 1997), policy entrepreneurs must display a broad set of skills, and high levels of motivation to engage in action and accomplish their goals. In this light, the literature on policy entrepreneurs has mainly focused on high-level decision-makers, ignoring low and middle-level bureaucrats (FRISCH-AVIRAM, COHEN; BEERI. 2018), keeping such policies delivering government employees away from the “policy entrepreneur” label (ARNOLD, 2015).

In 1980, Michael Lipsky published his book "Street-Level Bureaucracy," labeling the frontline low-level bureaucrats as “street-level bureaucrats” (SLB). These workers mobilize resources in order to safeguard pet policies outcomes at the micro-level, consequently shaping

policies in their daily decision-making process (LIPSKY, 1980; RICUCCI 2005; COHEN, 2018).

These bureaucrats sometimes are the ultimate delivers of public policies designed by higher instances of government, personally facing the clash between reality and what is designed on paper. The importance of these government workers and the challenges they face rises as the complexity of the public problem they are trying to mitigate increases. Such is the case of the frontline workers who operate in the Viva Vida Centers (CVV), an innovative and essential micro-regional health care location of secondary referral that aims to mitigate child and maternal mortality in the State of Minas Gerais (SOUZA; MOREIRA, 2009).

The CVV are part of The Viva Vida Network, which emerged from the acknowledgment that many deaths of women and children could be avoided through effective family planning; actions of sexual and reproductive health care; high quality prenatal, labor and puerperium care; attention to child health; the incentive to breastfeeding, vaccination, and control of childhood prevalent illness (MARQUES; SOUZA; MOREIRA, 2009). The centers are essential for the success and consolidation of the network and are directly responsible for reducing child mortality and maternal mortality rates through integral care to sexual and reproductive health based on gender and reproductive rights and provision of child health attention, especially for those in risky situations.

The services in the Viva Vida Centers include appointments and group activities with pediatricians, nurses, psychologists, physiotherapists, nutritionists, and social assistants(DE CASTRO MOREIRA, 2010). In direct contact with citizens and their various needs, these doctors, nurses, psychologists, physiotherapists, nutritionists, and social assistants are the ultimate deliverers of children and women health services.

However, policy entrepreneurship literature overlooks street-level bureaucrats like those who compose the professional staff of the Viva Vida Centers, as if their entrepreneurship is "theoretically unexpected" (ARNOLD, 2015, p.310). Arnold (2015) points out that it might be due to their helplessness when it comes down to the requirements to transform or modify everyday practices, to the extent street-level bureaucrats are under constraints imposed by "overwhelming clients' needs and limited time and resources" (ARNOLD, 2015, p.310) as they must manage contradictory political mandates.

Nevertheless, in light of street-level bureaucrats' close position to citizens and the very own nature of activity, Arnold (2015), Durose (2007), Petchey, Williams, and Carter (2008) have linked street-level bureaucrats with policy entrepreneurship. They highlight the use of

entrepreneurial actions by street-level bureaucrats via implementation practices to shape policy, giving such individuals the status of street-level policy entrepreneurs (SLPE) (FRISCH-AVIRAM, COHEN; BEERI, 2017). However, there is a considerable difference between using entrepreneurial actions in the context of policy implementation and actually changing the policy itself through entrepreneurial activity resulting in a formal institutional change (LAVEE; COHEN, 2019; FRISCH-AVIRAM, COHEN; BEERI, 2017).

Aware of such gap in literature, the studies of Lavee and Cohen (2019) and Frish-Aviram, Cohen, and Beeri (2017), using the case study of Israeli waste separation and renewal local authorities, maintain that SLPE under certain conditions may become part of the political game, not just by engaging in informal and innovative practices of implementation, but also through direct involvement in policy design.

Immersed in a broad network that provides health services to children and women in all three levels of health assistance, health professionals of the Vida Vida Centers are responsible for mitigating child mortality rates through their active and direct service while under significant restraints of resources. The outcome of these professionals' work directly impacts the funding of the structure they work in and of the service they provide, once the money flows as long as the goals previously set in the Commitment and Goals Agreement are being achieved (MINAS GERAIS, 2015). The complexity of child mortality (RAVALLION, 2011) combined with its national and international appeal, as it synthesizes a country's status of development (SZWARCWALD, 1997), and the pressure for good outcomes over such individuals put the Viva Vida Centers' street levels bureaucrats in a very similar context of those studied by Lavee and Cohen (2019) and Frish-Aviram, Cohen and Beeri (2017)

In the face of the previous contextualization, the research question that guided this work was: **How do street-level bureaucrats in the Viva Vida Center's context use entrepreneurial strategies to shape policy via implementation practices and/or change policy design?** Thus this work's main objective was to investigate engagement of street-level bureaucrats working within the Viva Vida Centers from the South East Macro-Region of Minas Gerais – formed by the Ponte Nova, Viçosa and Manhuaçu micro-regions – in entrepreneurial actions by the use of entrepreneurial strategies to shape policy through implementation practices and/or influence policy design directly. Specifically, it was sought to identify what prompted street-level bureaucrats to act as policy entrepreneurs, identify what strategies they adopted to shape policy and what personal attributes contributed to their success.

Aiming to attain the previous goal, the research was carried out at regional level. The literature points out that the centralization of secondary care in sanitary micro-regions is the most rational choice in terms of efficiency of the applied resources and optimizing the social assistance network set in place (MENDES, 2008; MARQUES; SOUZA; MOREIRA, 2009). Therefore, this research's object of study were the street level bureaucrats who operate in the scope of the Centros Viva Vida in the South East Macro-Region of Minas Gerais – formed by the Ponte Nova, Viçosa and Manhuaçu micro-regions.

Studies like the one of Borges & Pinto (2016) have shown that Viçosa has achieved relatively good results in mitigating child mortality, presenting a child mortality rate of 7,6; 10,2 and 12,3 in the years of 2013,2015 and 2016 respectively. In the same sense, the study of Temóteo *et al* (2019) have indicated that the Micro-Region of Manhuaçu has also achieved good results in the mitigation of child mortality, seeing its CMR drop 50% from 2008 to 2016.

The specific objectives of this research were:

1. Identify under what organizational and political conditions street-level bureaucrats will act as policy entrepreneurs.
2. Identify what strategies street-level bureaucrats adopt to shape policy
3. Identify the factors that explain the success of street-level policy entrepreneurs.

Overall, this research is justified for its goal to identify at the regional level if street-level bureaucrats engaged in entrepreneurial action to shape policies. Therefore, seeking to draw lessons from the bureaucrats that work in the Viva Vida Center in the micro-region of Viçosa, this research aimed to provide a theoretical framework that points out the conditions that prompt entrepreneurship among such street-level bureaucrats, possibly filling gaps on administration literature concerning the potential of micro-level actions of frontline workers to influence policy.

This research also aimed to contribute to policy entrepreneurship literature by broadening the knowledge of conditions that motivate entrepreneurial behavior, the strategies that go with it, and possible reasons for success and failure.

In addition to this introductory part, this work is divided into four other sections. The second section comprises the theoretical framework. Subsequently, the third section presents the locus and contextualization of the study. The fourth section presents the adopted methodological procedures. The fifth section displays the attained results.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section is composed of three main parts: (2.1) Entrepreneurship; (2.2) Public Sector Entrepreneurship; (2.3) Policy Entrepreneurship; with the subdivisions: (2.1.1) Entrepreneurship within Sociology and Psychology; (2.3.1) The policy entrepreneur profile; (2.3.2) Policy entrepreneurship in the context of street-level bureaucrats.

2.1 Entrepreneurship

From the French word *entrenprendre*, meaning "to do something," the word "entrepreneur" in the Middle Ages identified an active individual, a person able to get things done (HOSELITZ, 1951). The English economist John Stuart Mill around the 1850s introduced the term to his colleagues, and it became current in the field of economics; since then, other social sciences have also carried out studies on the subject outside economics, such as psychology, sociology, economic history and economic anthropology (SWEDBERG, 2000).

Swedberg (2000) points out that a plethora of interesting analysis on entrepreneurship can be found in the massive body of work produced over the years by social scientists within economics and outside of it. Within economics, Peter Klein, in his work "Towards a theory of public entrepreneurship," highlights three lenses of analysis of the entrepreneurial activity that are particularly valuable, Knight (1921), Kirzner (1973), and Schumpeter (1934). The constructs mentioned above are valuable to the extent they do not focus on entrepreneurship as a specific individual quality nor on a specific type of firm but as an activity performed by individuals under many circumstances (KLEIN *et al.,* 2010).

Frank Knight, an economist from the Chicago School of Economics, published in 1921 the paper “Risk, Uncertainty and Profit." The scholar, aiming to shed light on entrepreneurial conceptualization and activity, brought up the concepts of risk and uncertainty, basilar to his work. Knight's differentiation between both concepts has been understood as the differentiation between measurable and unmeasurable. Once in risk situations, one can assign probabilities to outcomes, whereas in uncertain situations, one cannot (LANGLOIS; COSGEL, 1993).

Thus, Knight advocates that one should not conceive entrepreneurship as only investments under risk since return distribution is not objectively known (ASTEBRO *et al.,* 2014). The Knightian perspective is that entrepreneurship is to make a judgmental decision about investments under uncertain situations (KLEIN *et al.,* 2010; BEWLEY, 1989). This judgment call implies asset ownership, as this judgment is nothing more than decision making

over the use of resources, once “An entrepreneur without capital goods is in Knight’s sense no entrepreneur” (KLEIN, 2008, p.178).

Israel Kirzner, economist, closely identified with the Austrian School, published his influential pieces of work on entrepreneurship in 1973 and later in 1997, the first, "Competition and Entrepreneurship" and the later "Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process." Swedberg (2000) stated that Kirzner's position on entrepreneurship evolved and comes down to alertness towards profit opportunities.

The pure entrepreneurial profit is nothing but return from alertness, not from “waiting” or any other form of return from capital, much less a reward for bearing uncertainty (RICKETS; KIRZNER, 1992). Once alert to the profit opportunities and incentives, the entrepreneur engages in market-driven behavior, exerting competitive-oriented activities, helping to push prices and quantities toward their equilibrium by exploring the gaps in the marketplace (SUNDQVIST *et al*., 2012; KLEIN *et al.,* 2010; SWEDBERG, 2010).

Kirzner’s perspective is rather curious once the entrepreneur in the scholar’s construct does not need to possess any assets since all his profits come from the alertness to opportunities. This "free-floating wraith” form of entrepreneur drew fire from several critics (ROTHBARD, 1985), who argued that if one has nothing to lose, one cannot be said to bear risk, “which is the essence of Mises concept of entrepreneurship” (HERBERT; LINK, 1989, p.8). Israel Kirzner’s response is somewhat simple, as he sets forth that the entrepreneur does not need to own assets, nor be a capitalist, once he can draw attention from the real capitalists, inducing them to invest in his ideas (ROTHBARD, 1985). Ultimately, the entrepreneur is, therefore, not an investor but the idea man.

A representative of the Germanic Historical School, Joseph Schumpeter dedicated most of his academic life to the study of entrepreneurship and innovation, based on a dynamic and change-oriented approach. The construct built by Schumpeter in his work "Theory of economic development" from 1934 places entrepreneurship as the creation of innovation understood as the recombination of preexisting production factors or a change in the production function (ROBERTS, 1992). As a result, entrepreneurship and innovation are interrelated since the entrepreneurial role, in this case, can only be understood through Schumpeter’s perspective on innovation (HAGEDOORN, 1996).

As defined above, entrepreneurship disturbs existing patterns of resource allocation through bold and creative actions (KLEIN *et al.,* 2010). Unlike Kirzner (1973), who conceived entrepreneurship and its results as a balancing force, Schumpeterian innovation causes

disequilibrium and alterations in the market structure (LANGLOIS, 2002). As maintained by Langlois (2002), eventually, this rupture process settles down, and equilibrium is restored until the next innovation emerges, resulting in a punctuated pattern of economic development.

What sets Schumpeter's entrepreneur apart from other agents is his proactivity, his pursuit for new ways and possibilities to implement his ideas, challenging the *status quo* (VALADARES, 2016; BULL; WILLARD, 1993; CARVALHO, 2011). In this light, entrepreneurial action results in creative destruction, a process coined by Schumpeter that dismantles long-standing practices to make way for innovation, in which the value generated by innovation in products and services causes displacement or diminishment of the value of current products and services (ARGAWAL; AUDRETSCH; SARKA, 2007). Although a risky process, once it challenges routines, requires additional capital, and needs to overcome resistance, the entrepreneur faces such risks indirectly since he is aware of their existence, but it is the capitalist who indeed bears those (ROBERTS, 1992).

Although of undeniable relevance, Schumpeter's work did not go without drawing critics, "It is often said that Schumpeter glorifies the entrepreneur and portrays him as a kind of aristocratic hero who has little in common with a businessman in the real world" (SWEDBERG, 2000, p.17). Although the criticism may be pertinent at some level, Swadberg (2000) clarifies that the author's work is much more precious than generally thought, and a thorough study of his work from a practical entrepreneurship perspective would be worth it.

Summarized in Table 1 are the main aspects of the previously analyzed perspectives. The economic views on entrepreneurship in Table 1 are essential for understanding the entrepreneurial conceptualization and its role in market-oriented economies. Nevertheless, contributions are not limited to the economic field, also coming from constructs and studies carried out within other social sciences, especially psychology and sociology. Scholars from these fields, such as Max Weber, Emily Durkheim, Karl Marx, and psychologist David McClelland, have produced outstanding work on entrepreneurship. Valadares (2016) states that elements present, especially in Weber and McClelland's works, contribute in an effective way for the theorization of entrepreneurship in the public sector. Therefore, the next session highlights some of the contributions coined by these two authors.

Table1 – Main economic approaches on entrepreneurship

School of Thought	Author	Key concept(s)	Asset owner entrepreneur	Risk/uncertainty bearer
Chicago	Frank Knight	Judgment on investments under uncertainty	Yes	Yes
Austrian	Israel Kirzner	Alertness to opportunities	No	No
German	Joseph Schumpeter	Innovation and creative destruction	No	No

Source: Prepared by the author based on Valadares (2016)

2.1.1 Entrepreneurship within Sociology and Psychology

Max Weber was a German political economist and sociologist who focused mainly on western societies and their political, economic, legal, and religious development. With a wide-ranged and modernist approach, the scholar combined numerous social thought traditions, such as the German Historical School and the Marxist School of Economics (MODY; DAY, 2016).

In one of his most outstanding works, Weber analyzed religion and its respective effect on society's economic organization, maintaining religious beliefs as the driving or restraining force of entrepreneurial activity (BROUWER, 2002). The author in "Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" from 1930, came up with the thesis that the worldly asceticism in specific Protestant branches enabled the rising of an ethic of calculability, efficiency, and self-control, crucial to the establishment of entrepreneurial capitalism in the 16th and 17th centuries (RUEF; LOUNSBURY, 2007).

In Germany, some of the Protestant branches (Calvinism, Pietism, Methodism, and Baptist sects), due to their faith and ethical guidelines, were mainly responsible for the rise of the spirit that propelled the modern western economies (SANTIAGO, 2009). These Protestant branches developed a positive attitude towards moneymaking and labor, resulting in a positive change of attitude regarding entrepreneurship (SWEDBERG, 2006).

Associating it with the idea of a social type, Weber conceptualizes the entrepreneur as the carrier of distinct ethics when compared to pre-capitalism individuals, once the entrepreneur is a result of a modern capitalist society, who owns a strong nature, high capacity for action, and guided by values and bounded rationality (VALADARES, 2016; MARTES, 2010).

In this sense, Swedberg (2006, p.251) points out that

> Weber's main contribution to the theory of entrepreneurship can be found in his analysis of that special type of human being—the charismatic person—who makes other people want to follow him or her, by virtue of their extraordinary personality. It is clear, to repeat, that there exist some parallels between Weber's charismatic person and Joseph Schumpeter's entrepreneur—both are extraordinary and somewhat Romantic personalities whose activities revolutionize the world around them.

A Harvard psychologist, David McClelland's contribution to entrepreneurship studies rests in the development of the Achievement Motivational Theory in his book "The Achieving Society," from 1961. Through the lenses of humanist management theories, McClelland sought to apply behavioral principles in the context of entrepreneurship, aiming to explain why some societies are more economically successful than others (MCCLELLAND, 1961). Seeking answers, the scholar focused on individuals' entrepreneurial behavior, since he considered it the key to economic development (COLLINS; HANGES; LOCKE, 2004; STEWART; ROTH, 2007).

McClelland maintains that entrepreneurs act under uncertainty, doing things in new and improved ways, and are the owners of a need for achievement that bestows them with a driving force for excelling (PANDEY; TEWARY, 1979). Aiming to unveil the traits that could be present in the entrepreneurial profile, the scholar understands that the formation of this profile results from the entrepreneur's environment (VALADARES, 2016; HASHIMOTO; 2016). Therefore, McClelland (1961) hypothesizes that nations with higher means of the need for achievement (nAch) would be the ones with higher levels of entrepreneurial activity and economic growth, subsequently finding a statistically significant relationship between the nAch and the level of economic growth of the country.

2.2 Public sector entrepreneurship

At this point, it is clear-cut that the initial debates on entrepreneurship came from within market-oriented spheres. In this highly dynamic and competitive environment, private organizations' endeavor for survival and success calls forth an agent that through bold, risky, and innovative action ambitions to generate value. Nonetheless, studies like Westlund (2011) and Weerawardena & Mort (2006) have maintained the multidimensionality of entrepreneurship, indicating that entrepreneurial action surpasses the private sector. Such characteristics bestow entrepreneurship a universal quality, delineating the construct's appropriateness in private and public contexts (MORRIS; JONES, 1999).

The entrepreneurial activity inside the public domain has been gaining a growing number of adherents and advocates, and debate on the theme has been fruitful since the last

decades of the 20th century (ROBERTS, 1992; VALADARES, 2016). By the end of the 1960s, scholars began to recognize the high complexity of many public problems as they defied the preexisting systems of definition, administration, and resolution of problems (WEBER; KHADEMIAN, 2008). In this light, public service organizations need to embrace entrepreneurship as much as any private organizations do since the issues and problems facing public organizations are of significant dimensions and complexity (DRUCKER, 2014; COHEN; EIMICKE 2003).

One of the first studies dedicated to public entrepreneurship dates back to Ostrom (1964) a seminal study for the theme. Ostrom (1964) exposes that the public sector entrepreneurship is based on a tripartite division, where the managing capacity directly affects the ability to innovate. Albeit emerging in the 1960s, Shockley, Frank & Stough (2002) draws attention to the fact that the circumstances of the period were not favorable for integrating the concept of public sector entrepreneurship within public organizations, defining it as an "embryonic" idea at that time (SHOCKLEY; FRANK; STOUGH, 2002, p.208).

It was not until the 1970s, due to the rising doubts surrounding the capacity of the European welfare state to meet state and society's needs effectively, that the ideas and models on public sector entrepreneurship integrated public organizations (MORAIS et al., 2015). Namely, public management scholars began to perceive public sector entrepreneurship as a path for a more objective and flexible public management (VALADARES, 2016).

Still on the integration of the public sector entrepreneurship to public management, the 1980s was a crucial period. In this referred decade, the New Public Management was widespread by Anglo-Saxon ideals (CAVALCANTE, 2018), strongly present in the discourses of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the most influential heads of State in that time (DIEFENBACH, 2009). Reaching a global scale, with a market and stakeholders orientation and labeling citizens as clients, the approach sought to integrate the entrepreneurial discourse with the public sector sphere (KETTL, 2006). In the New Public Management context, the public management microcosm is guided by the efficiency in the procedures, whether it is by solving the distrust issue between the legislative and executive, considering how public agents can be motivated to develop intelligent work or how to evaluate if the job done is efficient and effective (DIEFENBACH, 2009).In this sense, Edwards *et al.* (2002, p.152, our emphasis) express that:

> The discourse of entrepreneurship has become part of the managerialism discourse. Those who are attracted to such a concept find that it supports the notion that managers should be allowed the freedom to manage (particularly embraced by those brought

> into the public services from the private sector) and endowed with discretion**. It may also legitimate a commercial public service that defines itself as anti-bureaucracy, innovative, and risk-taking**.

On the other hand, Paula (2005) points out that as the management culture walks into the public sector domain, there is a loss in terms of democracy once technical values solely guide the decisions. In the matter, Bellone & Goerl (1992) highlights three main conflicts between entrepreneurial action and democratic values. The first conflict takes place between entrepreneurial autonomy/discretion and democratic accountability. The authors claim that with the increased complexity of revenue problems facing governments, public administrators demand higher levels of discretion to implement their entrepreneurial revenue search, making public accountability more difficult. The second conflict happens between entrepreneurial visions and the need for citizens' input in democratic contexts. As Bellone & Goerl (1992) notes, entrepreneurs tend to be more knowledgeable than the rest, coming up with unusual ideas. The last conflict highlighted by the scholars happens between the entrepreneurs' necessity for secrecy and the democratic guidelines of conducting public business with disclosure of information in all stages if the policymaking process.

Therefore, the public sector entrepreneur is defined by his capacity to foster efficiency, flexibility, and adaptation skills in a conflictive, highly risky, and competitive environment, generating innovations and disrupting the *status quo* (FRISCH-AVIRAM; BEERI; COHEN, 2020; SCHUMPETER, 1934).

2.3 Policy entrepreneurship

Considering the objectives of this study, it is necessary to distinguish between the two forms of public sector entrepreneurship: public entrepreneurship and policy entrepreneurship. The public entrepreneurship literature focuses on the public sector's internal aspects, bringing to light the role of the public entrepreneur in building and improving public organizations (BERNIER; HAFSI, 2007; MEYNHARDT; DIEFENBACH, 2012; ZAMPETAKIS; MOUSTAKIS, 2010). According to Frisch-Aviram, Beeri and Cohen (2019) the focus of this literature is on procedural development in the scope of public policies implementation, encompassing four different levels: (1) the organization, (2) the government, (3) the task environment, and (4) the key stakeholders. The second form is policy entrepreneurship, seen through the analytical lens proposed by Kingdon (2003). Policy entrepreneurs can go beyond the implementation phase, as they also work to shape the formulation of policies (ROBERTS; KINGS, 1991).

In the political sciences, in the 1980s, John Kingdon weaved the concept of the policy entrepreneur to understand the political agenda-setting inside the United States Federal Government. Acting inside the scope of the Multiple Streams, the policy entrepreneurs, as described by Kingdon (2003, p.20), “are willing to invest their resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems, are responsible not only for prompting important people to pay attention but also for coupling solutions to problems and for coupling both problems and solutions to politics." This definition gets clearer as one navigates through Kingdon’s model.

The Multiple Streams Model proposed by Kingdon (2003) draws from the Garbage Can Model (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972), a study that aimed to analyze health and transportation public policies carried out by the North American government.

“Why do some problems become important to the government?" is the question that guides Kingdon in his work “Agenda, alternatives and public policies." Kingdon (2003) establishes that four different processes form public policies: setting an agenda, considering existing alternatives, selecting an alternative, and finally implementing the decision. In the Multiple Streams model, the author's attention turns to the first two processes: forming the agenda (agenda setting) and the possible alternatives for policy formulation.

From this perspective, Kingdon (2003) sets out two different agendas: the governmental agenda and the decision agenda. The first type concerns the issues that attract government authorities’ attention. At the same time, the latter is a subset of the governmental agenda, composed of issues that are ready for the policymakers’ active decision. Thus, to understand how such issues become part of the government’s agenda in the United States of America, Kingdon (2003) defines that such a process occurs through three independent decision-making streams: problem stream, the solution stream, and the politics stream. The streams converge at critical moments, resulting in changes in the agenda.

Concerning the problems stream, it is necessary to enlighten the difference between issues and problems. At the same time, the first is a perceived social situation that does not necessarily arouse an action, a problem besides being a social situation, draws the attention of actors present in the decision-making process (SUBIRATS, 2006). Government authorities recognize the need for action through three main elements: indicators, focal events, and feedback from government actions (KINGDON, 2003).

The second stream proposed by Kingdon (2003) consists of the available set of possible solutions. It is important to stress that the solutions in this stream are not strictly linked to specific problems. In light of an analogy with the natural selection process, Capella (2007)

underlines that alternatives and solutions permeate/float among policy communities formed by researchers, parliamentary advisors, academics, civil servants, etc. Within this environment, solutions are subject to competition, combination, and discarding, where only those with higher levels of viability and chances of survival emerge.

Unlike the solutions stream, negotiation and bargaining prevail in the politics stream, having its own rules and dimensions. In this sense, three main elements within the politics stream influence the governmental agenda: national mood, organized political forces, and changes within the government itself. When these last three elements converge, there might be an opportunity for changes in the agenda (CAPELLA, 2007).

In this context, Kingdon (2003) draws the concept of policy windows; when an issue is recognized as a problem, a viable solution exists, and the political environment enables its approach through its access to the government's agenda. Thus, shifts in the governmental agenda happen when the three streams come together. However, policy windows are not permanent and close very fast (KINGDON, 2003). The policy entrepreneur must be aware of the policy windows that open, acting to tie the three streams together, coupling problems to solutions, and solutions to favorable political moments. Figure 1 summarizes this process.

Figure 1 – Multiple Streams model



Source: Capella (2006, p. 32)

Howlett, Perl & Ramesh (2013) express that John Kingdon enabled the development of a theoretical framework that explores the role of policy entrepreneurs within and outside governmental boundaries. The authors highlight that Kingdon (2003) sought to apprehend the

part policy entrepreneurs take concerning constructing and using changes inside the governmental agenda.

Jones (1978) argues that policy entrepreneurs are agents with the capacity to share the interest in providing a collective good or a common objective while believing in benefits for themselves. Namely, in this case, the policy entrepreneur is a *homo economicus politicus*, carrier of perfect rationality, making decisions based on complete information in a market-oriented political scenario.

However, Akril, Kay & Zahariadis (2013) maintain that the policymaking process and, therefore, the action of policy entrepreneurs happen in a context of high levels of ambiguity. In other words, policy entrepreneurs operate in a scenario where preferences are opaque and not well defined. In this light, while Kingdon (2003) believes that formulators have previously defined preferences, Zahariadis (2007) points out that the preferences of formulators shift at every moment, therefore adding more complexity to analysis carried out through the theoretical lenses of the Multiple Streams

Nevertheless, Weick (2001) points out that the Multiple Streams approach creates an effective way of explaining how the political systems and organizations assign meaning to a mostly ambiguous world. In this sense, the real contribution of Kingdom (2003) for the policy analysis process would reside in the constructions of theoretical lenses and practical tools to capture reality in its full complexity (SILVA, 2018).

2.3.1 The policy entrepreneur profile

As agents who aim to generate change through policies that are new to the government (MINTRON, 1997), policy entrepreneurs' behavior, despite their reasons, follows specific patterns that shed light on four crucial elements of policy entrepreneurship (MINTRON & NORMAN, 2009).

To seize an opportunity, one must first recognize it; therefore, "The policy entrepreneur who is ready, rides whatever comes along. Any crisis is seized as an opportunity" (KINGDON, 2003, p.182). Mintron & Norman (2009) exposes the importance of context in the prospects of success for policy innovation advocates, bringing to light the first element change agents must display: social acuity. When it comes to understanding others and engaging in policy-related conversations, the authors specify that a policy entrepreneur can display social acuity in two primary forms. The first is by making good use of social networks, once engaging in relevant social networks, increases the chance of success for policy entrepreneurs. The second way is

by understanding the idea, motives, and concerns of other agents in their political context because well-connected policy actors with good relationships have higher chances of success when trying to achieve policy innovation.

As noted previously, problem definition is an essential part of the policymaking process. Mintron & Norman (2009) define that problem definition is always a political act. How problems are defined affects what individuals and groups will pay attention, and how people relate specific issues with their interests. Therefore, the second core element of the policy entrepreneurship process is the attention policy entrepreneurs must pay to problem definition. Given the circumstances, policy entrepreneurs must show compelling evidence of an imminent crisis, push for a type of problem definition over others, point out failures in current policy settings and gather support from actors outside the scope of the problem (KINGDON, 2003; ROBERTS & KING, 1991)

A policy initiative does not go far without various actors involved; the policy entrepreneurship process is teamwork. The third core element of the policy entrepreneurial process is team building. Norman & Mintron (2009) make it clear that the strength of policy entrepreneurs comes from their team working skills, the size, and the composition of the coalition they build, as it indicates the range of support for their proposal.

The last central element proposed by the scholars is leading by example. For the authors, the risk aversion is common among decision-makers, and it poses a significant challenge for innovation advocates. Therefore, aiming to reduce risk perception among decision-makers, to build credibility and momentum for change, policy entrepreneurs take matters into their own hands as they lead by example, taking an idea and making it happen on a smaller scale.

Such core elements are not defining in terms of whether a policy entrepreneur will or will not achieve success, to the extent that actors who do not display the set of behaviors listed above can generate innovation. The four core elements provide a starting point for understanding how the policy entrepreneurship process is affected by the context it is in, and how policy entrepreneurs can enhance their performance and provide means by diagnosing reasons of failure (NORMAN; MINTRON, 2009).

2.3.2 Street-level bureaucrats, implementation and the entrepreneurial endeavor

Policy entrepreneurship is a relatively young research field (GUNN, 2017; BROUWER; BIERMANN, 2011). As previously exposed, policy entrepreneurs must display a broad set of skills and high motivation levels to engage in action and accomplish their goals. In this light,

the literature on policy entrepreneurs has mainly focused on high-level decision-makers, ignoring low and middle-level bureaucrats (FRISCH-AVIRAM, COHEN; BEERI. 2018), keeping policies delivering government employees away from the “policy entrepreneur” label (ARNOLD, 2015).

On the other hand, the literature on public bureaucracy was established even before the first decades if the 20th century, dating back from Wilson (1887). Even so, like in policy entrepreneurship literature, low and middle-range bureaucrats remained incognito until the first half of the 20th century. These bureaucrats were not approached in important works like Stein (1952), who discussed the administration's neutrality, the tension between law and formal and informal organizations. Others like Waldo (2006), Simon (2013), and Pressman & Wildavsky (1978) were also radio silent concerning normative issues and routine demands of low and middle-level bureaucrats, overlooking their unique role as frontline government employees (MAYNARD-MOODY; PORTILLO, 2010).

The blind eye turned on low and middle-level bureaucrats throughout the decades found its roots in the work of Woodrow Wilson. First published in 1887 and then republished in the North-American journal Political Science Quarterly, Wilson’s work synthesizes Administration Science's historical and doctrinal evolution. Disclosing its practices and methods, Wilson (1887) outlined the dichotomy between Politics and Public Administration, which reverberated on posterior Administration studies until nowadays. The former president conceived the Administration field as apolitical, where the executive methods should be grounded in well-established principles, safeguarded from the instability and consequences of practical experience. In this sense, while politics provides administrative tasks, the latter should not be managed by the first. The scholar drew a clear line: Politics is the arena of the statesmen, in which the State handles universal matters; while Administration is the arena of the technical staff, where the State handles small individual matters (WILSON, 1887). In this light, Woodrow Wilson’s work reserved the bureaucrats a place of neutral policy implementers.

This scenario took a turn when Michael Lipsky, in 1980, published his book "Street-Level Bureaucracy," labeling the frontline bureaucrats as “street-level bureaucrats” (SLB). Even though not the first effort towards displaying the centrality of frontline public servants in policy implementation (LIPSKY, 1970, 1978), Maynard-Moody and Portillo (2010) highlights that it remains the fullest expression of the “Street Level Bureaucracy Theory” (SLBT). In this sense, Hill and Hupe (2002) point out Lipsky as a critical figure for the bottom-up implementation, once SLB are essential agents for the implementation process. Endowed with

discretion, freedom, and autonomy while facing scarcity of resources and under enormous amounts of pressure from hierarchical control aiming to tackle possible failures, SLB establishes practices to cope with such (HILL; HUPE, 2002).

Therefore, these frontline workers mobilize resources to safeguard pet policy outcomes at the micro-level, consequently shaping policies in their daily decision-making process (LIPSKY, 1980; RICUCCI 2005; COHEN, 2018). Nevertheless, these actors are still overlooked by policy entrepreneurship literature. Arnold (2015) points out that it might be due to their helplessness when it comes down to the requirements to transform or modify everyday practices, to the extent street-level bureaucrats are under constraints imposed by overwhelming clients' needs, limited time, and resources as well as contradictory political mandates. Such helplessness prevents SLB actions from reaching substantial scope to be qualified as real innovations. As a result, policy entrepreneurship literature overlooks these implementing bureaucrats, as if their policy entrepreneurship is "theoretically unexpected" (ARNOLD, 2015, p.310).

At the same time, due to their position and nature of their activity, street-level bureaucrats hold advantages that lie in their closeness with the field, in their familiarity with those who operate within it, and in their ability when it comes to identifying social needs and windows of opportunity for action (LAVEE; COHEN 2019). In light of these privileges, in the past ten years, studies such as Arnold (2015), Durose (2007), Petchey at al. (2008) have linked street-level bureaucrats with entrepreneurial action. The works highlight the use of entrepreneurial strategies by street-level bureaucrats via implementation practices to shape policy.

From su*ch perspective, the role of SLBs who are proactive and harness support, resources and energy to secure the implementation of innovative policies has been approached by the innovation literature. These individuals are labeled as champions and are directly involved with prototyping and implementing an innovative idea, assuming risks and looking for support within their organization to pave a way for smooth implementation (ROBERTS, 1992; CROSBY; STONE, 2006). Thus, for holding a position in the stage of implementation and not influencing policy formulation , champions are set apart from policy entrepreneurs, i.e., they are not the idea people but the ones who keeps the ball rolling (ROBERTS, 1992). Although formally differentiated by the stage they act in, the lines separating policy entrepreneurs and champions are sometimes blurred in literature. The work of Medeiros and Lima (2012) have pointed strong convergent elements in the concepts of "champions" and

"policy entrepreneur", bringing the literatures on public sector innovation and public policies closer.

Extending this idea, Lavee and Cohen (2019) and Frish-Aviram, Cohen, and Beeri (2017), using the case study of Israeli waste separation and renewal local authorities maintain that SLPE under certain conditions may become part of the political game, not just by engaging in informal and innovative practices of implementation, but also through direct involvement in policy design.

In this sense, Arnold (2020) argues that SLPEs are those who (1) invest time, energy and resources to shape work process and outcomes; (2) seek to innovate in such processes and outcomes; (3) encourage others to adopt their innovation or aim to institutionalize them affecting policy design. But what prompts them? How do they do it? , Lavee and Cohen (2019) and Frish-Aviram, Cohen, and Beeri (2017) offered possible answers to those questions.

Two main questions guide both works: (1) what strategies do street-level bureaucrats adopt to increase their influence on policy design? (2) Under what conditions do they act as policy entrepreneurs seeking to change policy? Considering all the contextual particularities, the results enrichen the framework on SLPE and are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 – Results of Lavee and Cohen (2019) and Frish-Aviram, Cohen & Beeri (2017)

Authors	Conditions	Strategies
Lavee and Cohen (2019)	• Acute Crisis • Lack of effective knowledge • Demand for political activism	• Multidimensional coalition building • Acquirement of professional and political knowledge • Knowledge sharing with allies.
Frish-Aviram, Cohen & Beeri (2017)	• Format of governance regime (less traditional and more governance oriented administrative systems).	• Creation of media awareness • Conduction of small pilot projects • Empowerment of initiative believers • Convincement of initiative non-believers • Contact with their own bureaucrats' community

Source: Prepared by the author based on Lavee and Cohen (2019) and Frish-Aviram, Cohen & Beeri (2017)

Under what conditions do they act as policy entrepreneurs seeking to change policy?

Lavee and Cohen (2019) identified three main elements motivating SLB to engage in entrepreneurial activities to influence policy design: perceptions of an acute **crisis**, **lack of**

effective knowledge on the issue, and **demand for political activism**. Concerning organizational and professional goals, SLB became aware of a crisis when they believed that without intervening, their organizations and professional interests could have been harmed by new circumstances that they had little control over, and losses were likely. Under this scenario, the authors found that some SLB went beyond influencing policy just via implementation, as they aimed to impact policy design by going up the bureaucratic ladder and bringing their ideas and concerns to policymakers. Another situation that encouraged policy entrepreneurship among SLB was the lack of professional and political knowledge necessary to influence policy and fulfill duties successfully. Aware of such knowledge shortage, a few SLB engaged in innovative methods aiming to gather enough knowledge to change policy. Such behavior is linked to the rise in incentives for innovations in the organizational environment, rooted by the New Public Management, combined with an increasing demand for political activism. Such demands refer to the traditional forms of political participation, and when they fail, "street-level bureaucrats sometimes engage in patterns of political participation that are akin to policy entrepreneurship" (LAVEE; COHEN, 2019, p.14).

Frish-Aviram, Cohen & Beeri (2017) identify one main contextual element that motivates SLB to engage in entrepreneurial action: the format of governance regime. The authors point out that in less traditional and more governance oriented administrative systems, with less hierarchy and more laterality, SLB are partners in the decision-making process; therefore, they may find an easier path to act as policy entrepreneurs.

In this sense, the authors explain that in the Israeli context, the shift from conservative public administration to lateral governance had a positive impact on what concerns street-level bureaucrats engaging in policy entrepreneurship. This finding adds to policy entrepreneurship literature by explaining how changes in the political stream affect policy entrepreneurs. In this sense, institutional change promoted by external parties can be used as policy windows, assisting policy change.

What strategies do street-level bureaucrats adopt to increase their influence on policy design?

Lavee and Cohen (2019) disclosed three main strategies adopted by street-level policy entrepreneurs: multidimensional coalition building, acquiring professional and political knowledge, and sharing knowledge with allies. **The first action** is also present in Norman & Mintron (2009). SLPE in the Israeli study sought to create alliances in all levels of bureaucracy, organizations, and society. The alliances identified were cross-sectorial, inter-ministerial, and

cross-hierarchical. The main characteristic of this coalition resides in the multiple capacities, skills, and knowledge that each player brings. The context of such alliances, although not being specified, also required governance-oriented environments, with less hierarchy and more laterality.

To fulfill the gaps concerning the necessary professional and political knowledge for influencing matters of policy, to access information in the political field, and therefore spot policy windows, the authors revealed knowledge acquisition as **the second action**. Professional knowledge was acquired through the arrangement of conferences, workshops, attendance to academic courses, part-taking in ad hoc forums, and engagement in autodidactic forms of learning. As for the political knowledge, SLB sought to fill the knowledge gap by consulting agents who already possessed such political knowledge, engaging in political activity and getting feedback from them, learning from past political events, and learning from other agents' previous experiences. During this process, SLB realized that to change reality effectively, they had to address not only the local level but also the national level of decision-makers.

As for the **third action**, street-level bureaucrats have at their disposal fewer resources than other high-level elite bureaucrats do. In this light, SLB, employed a knowledge sharing action, sharing knowledge with others to provide their allies with the means to promote the desired changes in policy. In this scope, not only the necessary amount of knowledge becomes an issue but also the need to convince each person that they need that knowledge, thus having to share their political understanding of situations. The scholars expressed that SLB fulfilled this action by organizing workshops on professional and political aspects of the issue, promoting academic and non-academic courses on the matter, arranging departmental meetings for the exchange of ideas and activities, and finally by launching websites to provide citizens with necessary information.

Frish-Aviram, Cohen & Beeri (2017) identified **five strategies** overall. To draw attention to the issue, SLB adopted two actions. The **strategy action** was to create media awareness, aiming to pave the way for expanding the area of action. This action was carried out mainly through the diffusion of information on newspapers, and websites, as also identified by Lavee and Cohen (2019). The **second strategy** was to conduct small pilot projects to prove the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed change. Once the project succeeded, two other actions were employed aiming to maximize the benefits of existing social networks. Frish-Aviram, Cohen & Beeri (2017, p. 12) state, "Social networks are crucial in policy change, connecting policy problems to decision-makers." Through cross-sectoral, inter-ministerial, and

cross-hierarchical coalitions, **the third strategy** of SLB was to empower those who believed in the initiative, and **the fourth strategy** was to convince those who did not. Such strategies align with the third action identified by Lavee and Cohen (2019), about the sharing of information and political perspective. Therefore a shift from traditional forms of administration to a governance-oriented administration not only sets off the SLB into a new form of work as they go from being the sole supplier of services to working within networks to supply services, but the SLB can also find easier paths for constructing coalitions. The **last strategy** identified by the authors also goes towards the one identified by Lavee and Cohen (2019), as the scholars also revealed that SLB kept themselves acquainted with their community, consulting colleagues, learning from their experience, and previous entrepreneurial actions, unraveling problems and specific solution.

By revealing that SLB can engage in entrepreneurial action to influence policy design, both studies have shown the importance of political and governance tools. As the ones closer to citizen's needs and reality, Lavee and Cohen (2019) and Frish-Aviram, Cohen & Beeri (2017) have highlighted how policy entrepreneurship can affect the likelihood of success of SLB in influencing policy outcomes, going beyond informal changes performed during implementation. However, more research, especially in different contexts, must be carried out to comprehend better the barriers and challenges SLB faces when engaging in policy entrepreneurship activities.

2.3.3 The Policy process

As one seeks to understand the entrepreneurial role within the context of novelty generation in public policies, the policy process must also be taken into account. From recognizing a problem to its translation into action through a public policy, many stages take place, and within such stages, different actors play crucial roles, the policy entrepreneur included. While this work weaves together the concepts of street-level bureaucracy and policy entrepreneurship, casting light on how public policies come to life allows a better comprehension of the "arena" an SLB aiming to influence policy via entrepreneurial action plays in.

When it comes to the policy process as a field of study, Smith and Larimer (2009) point out that it failed to produce a single unifying theory. Such fact, in its essence, speaks volumes to the complexity and the diverse universe of the policy process (Weible et al., 2011). Over

time, different scholars have brought different designs and descriptions of how policies emerge and become concrete vehicles of government action.

Although such a plethora of perspectives on the policy process, one thing is sure, metaphors have long been a common ground to the distinct theories that have emerged throughout the decades. In particular, due to their analytical qualities, the multiple streams and the stages/cycles metaphors have propelled the studies on public policies.

The former, as previously exposed, set a looking glass over the agenda-setting, and through the metaphors of streams aims to explain how and why some problems catch the government attention while others do not, shedding light on the role of the policy entrepreneur in bringing the streams together and making a "river" (KOEBELE, 2021).

Zooming out from the agenda-setting perspective are the scholars of the policy cycle, describing a process guided through a sequence of the stage, commonly: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, implementation, evaluation, and termination (Laswell, 1948, 1965; deLeon 1999; May and Wildavsky 1978; Jenkins 1978). In this model, actions related to public policies are grouped, resulting in a set of political-administrative processes (Dye, 2005; Souza, 2006). The same applies to logical and non-chronological order once the process is not an order of events in a time sequence (Villanueva, 1993). Although the stages are presented sequentially, it does not necessarily represent reality. The model represents a reality that serves as an analytical tool, orienting studies, and is often not one hundred percent consistent with practical life.

The process model unveils patterns of activities or processes; therefore, it allows the study of how decisions are made or how they should be made, not enabling commenting on the substance of public policies; that is, the focus is on the processes. Despite the restriction, the model is helpful for understanding the activities involved in the elaboration of public policies.

As there is no consensus in the literature about the model, there might be variations on terminology and the number of steps, Figure 2 illustrates a seven phase Public Policy Cycle:

Figure 2 –The Policy Cycle



Source: Secchi (2013)

(i) Problem framing: the perception that a public situation is unsatisfactory and that the reality experienced by society is not ideal, directly affecting a group of citizens' life quality (SECCHI, 2013). The public problem is not an isolated element in society, and it is always linked to other factors; thus, it is essential that when a public problem is framed, the factors that contribute to its existence are also identified (SUBIRATS, 2006).

(ii) **Agenda-setting**: After a public problem is deemed relevant, it might become part of the government agenda (SECCHI, 2013). The agenda-setting, as described before, is the stage in which policy entrepreneurs often act, playing an essential role sometimes in making a problem out of an issue and inserting it into the official agenda. This stage is particularly relevant for this research once it investigates if SLBs from the Viva Centers sought to influentiate at any point governmental priorities concerning the health of women and children in the state of Minas Gerais.

For Subirats (2006), three characteristics help a problem to become part of the public agenda: (1) the general assessment of the problem's impact; (2) the assessment of the impact on social reality; (3) solution feasibility. However, the permanence of problems on the agenda varies according to their notoriety and relevance at a given time.

(iii) Formulating Alternatives: posterior to the insertion of the public problem in the agenda, viable alternatives are sorted out, aiming to determine the possible alternatives, while economic and technical feasibility are assed (SARAIVA, 2018).

(iv) Decision-making: after forming alternatives, the decision-making is when the selection and specification of the most viable alternative are carried out (SARAIVA, 2018). Moreover, at this stage, the interests of the actors and the objectives and methods are analyzed so that the public problem in question can be addressed (SECCHI, 2013).

(v) **Implementation:** As this work looks directly at the street level, this stage is crucial. This stage can be understood as the process that connects the objectives to the actions that make them achievable, the space between expectations and actual results. (CARVALHO et al., 2010; HILL; HUPE, 2002). Top-down scholars see formulators as the main actors in this stage, while bottom-up literature defends that implementation is more efficiently assed when the perspective of those providing the services is taken into consideration. Whatever the perspective, as Ollaik & Medeiros (2011) argue, the key element of implementation is human behavior. Such an insight is important for this work as it aims to unveil elements concerning the actions of SLBs responsible for implementing health services within a broad state public policy

(vi) Evaluation: it is the stage of the Public Policy Cycle in which the policy performance is analyzed, resulting in the production of feedback on the previous steps (SECCHI, 2013). Moreover, through it it is possible to analyze and measure the achievements of a public policy for society (SARAIVA, 2018). The evaluation can occur in three moments: (1) *Ex ante* evaluation (before implementation); (2) Evaluation *in itinere* (during implementation, as a monitoring mechanism); (3) *Ex post* evaluation (after implementation(SECCHI, 2013).

(vii) Extinction: after the actions carried out through the policy, it is possible that it might come to an end and may or may not be replaced by another (SECCHI, 2013).

As previously mentioned, the policy cycles models very often do not represent the real dynamics of a policy, as the phases sometimes can be intertwined, but they are useful in simplifying reality, allowing one to make sense out of the complex procedures that give life to a public policy. However, looking back to seminal scholars who debated on the entrepreneurial role, such as Knight (1921), Kirzner (1973), and Schumpeter (1934), the endeavor of creating novelty strictly tied to the concept of ideas and advocating on their behalf. Thus, as Brasil and Capella (2017) point out, the role of policy entrepreneurs has gained prominence through models that consider the role ideas play in the policy process. The authors highlight how

traditional models have generally devaluated the concept of ideas. Kigdom's model grants centrality to ideas, it seems more than a good fit to guide this work in assessing SLB's actions in influencing police.

2.3.4 Policy Change

The figure of the policy entrepreneur is broadly discussed in models centered on the importance of ideas and their advocacy (KINGDOM, 2003; BAUMGARTNER; JONES, 2005; SABATIER, 1998). Although taking different perspectives on the policy process, in all of these models, the role of the policy entrepreneurs comes down to promoting policy change. In this sense, understanding the nature of policy change is essential to better asses the potential and limitations of policy entrepreneurs.

Weible et al. (2012) stress that the changes in public policies could be a set of alterations in institutional rules, directly affecting daily operational activities within policy programs, to the rising of entirely new policies. The latter, though, does not seem to be the case very often. Policy problems are typically dealt with through a so-called incremental fashion, being taken as the normal way to make policies (HOWLETT; RAMESH, 1998). The same set of actors tend to be involved in the policy process for a long time, and push for massive change might generate to much friction with policy participants, and individuals, organizations, and systems subject to such change (HOWLETT; RAMESH, 1998; WEIBLE et al., 2012).

Hall (1990) addresses minor changes in policy as incremental change, while those representing dramatic reconceptualization and restructuring of policies go under the name of paradigmatic changes. Howlett and Ramesh (1998) state that both kinds of change in policy can happen at a fast or slow pace, and what defines if a change is incremental or paradigmatic and rapid or slow depends on whether changes in actors/interests and ideas happened. Changes in the episteme or knowledge base can generate paradigmatic changes in policy, while the absence of such change might generate incremental change. Changes in actors within policy networks or the set of interests can generate rapid changes, but change might be slow if it remains the same.

In this light, assuming Kingdom's perspective on how policies change, the nature of the policy change might depend on the elements providing a window of opportunity. Political turnovers represent the possibility of swift change in policy, while crises, indicators, and focal events might bring to light that the current set of knowledge and policies on such issue does not address it effectively, possibly demanding a paradigmatic change.

Hall (1990) offered insight on the operationalization of such incremental and paradigmatic changes. The author argues that changes can happen at three different levels. The first level occurs when the settings of policy instruments are altered, e.g., the shifting of lending rates within the context of British policy (HALL, 1990). The second level of change involves the change in policy instruments per se. Policy instruments are understood mainly as the tools used by policy makers to achieve a policy's goals (LINDER, PETERS; 1989; LASCOUMES; LE GALÈS, 2007). Such instruments can be mixed and combined to foster a policy and replaced and recombined when they are no satisfactory in terms of the policy goal (CAPANO.; HOWLETT, 2020). Hall exemplifies once again with British macroeconomic policy, stating that on several occasions from 1970 to 1989, the policy's goals remained the same. However, the techniques to achieve them were altered due to dissatisfaction with past experience. Concerning the third level of change, it takes place when goals fundamentally shift. The scholar exemplifies the British shift from Keynesian to monetarist models of macroeconomic regulation, also from 1970 to 1989, resulting in a simultaneous change in instrument settings, the instruments themselves, and the policy's goals. For Hall (1990), the first and second level are incremental while third level change is essentially paradigmatic.

Thus, drawing from the conceptualization above and Jones and Baumgartner (2005), it is clear that ideas come to life at any level, as actors in the policy process develop over time their perception of a social problem's nature, analyzing the fitting solutions and choosing among available options.

3 CONTEXT AND LOCUS OF THE STUDY

3.1 The Unified Health System and health assistance networks

The Federal Constitution of 1988 (CF/88) bestowed the Brazilian public health with new outlines to the extent it set in place the Unified Health System (SUS), one of the largest public health systems in the world (BRASIL, 1988). In this sense, through the CF/88, health became a social right for every citizen, meaning that every Brazilian should have granted access to assistance health services, free of legal, economical, physical, cultural or any other kind of hindrance that might compromise the universal quality of this access (PAIM, 2009; PAIM; SILVA, 2010).

Beyond universality, the CF/88 also established two other ethical principles for the SUS: equity and integrality. The equity principle unfolds from the universality principle and guarantees the consideration of the existing differences between the multiple groups of individuals, ensuring different treatment for different necessities, therefore mitigating social differences (CUNHA, 2001). As for the integrality principle, it ensures that all citizens must have access to all actions and services that each particular case or situation demands, through the articulation of healing and preventive actions in all three levels of assistance (PONTES *et al.,* 2009*;* MACHADO *et al.,* 2007). In this light, the Unified Health System has been enabling significant progress when it comes to the promotion of social justice and overcoming social inequalities.

As Pontes *et al.* (2008) highlighted, the CF/88 also provided organization principles regarding the SUS: decentralization, regionalization, hierarchization, and social participation. Thus, the SUS is a hierarchical and regionalized system of actions and public services founded on universality, integrality, equity, gratuitousness, decentralization, and social control. According to Marques, Souza & Moreira (2009), SUS's hierarchization and regionalization can be seen through two main aspects. The first aspect concerns the concentration of technology employed in the performed services and procedures, segregating health assistance in three different levels: primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter aspect concerns the distribution of the locations of health assistance throughout the national territory, following the logic that primary services must be closer to citizens, meanwhile, tertiary attention due to its technical complexity and the need for an adequate scale must be performed in regional poles.

In this sense, the State of Minas Gerais in 2003 developed the Plano Mineiro de Desenvolvimento Integrado (PMDI) 2007-2023, a long-term program aiming to promote the

development of all the regions of the State and to mitigate the existing inequalities between them (VIEIRA et al., 2010; CUSTODIO, 2014). This program consists of a long-term strategic plan aiming to guide the actions carried out by the Government of Minas Gerais in many areas. The document seeks to achieve by the year of 2023 the best Human Development Index of the country. In this context, concerning the public health area, the Programa Viva Vida was developed in October 2003, aiming to tackle children and women's health issues through the establishment of a health assistance network – Rede Viva Vida (Viva Vida Network) in the sanitary regions of the State.

The Pan-American Health Organizations(PAHO) (2009, p.31), define these health assistance networks as “network of organizations that provide or make arrangements to provide, equitable and integral health services to a defined population and that is willing to account for its clinical and economic results and for the health status of the population it serves." According to Kuschnir and Chorney (2010), the PAHO definition of health assistance networks is built around primary health care and the concept of equitable and integral health services, agreeing with the regionalized networks proposed by the Unified Health System and, providing conceptual clarity for networks organization in the Brazilian context. Concerning the State of Minas Gerais, Mendes (2007) points out that the networks were drawn from scientific clinical evidence defined in the guidelines prepared by the -(SES-MG), articulating the sanitary areas, levels, and health care locations.

Marques, Souza & Moreira (2009) point out that in the face of the scarcity of resources invested in the SUS, regionalization is the most rational choice since it promotes the efficiency of the applied resources and the optimization of the social assistance network set in place. In this sense, the authors explain that the SES-MG organized the 853 municipalities of the State in 75 micro-regions, from which 13 macro-regions were established.

In this perspective, for Mendes (2008), the efficiency of the Viva Vida Network rests in the decentralization of actions on primary healthcare for all the municipalities and, in the centralization of actions on secondary healthcare in the sanitary micro-regions, and of actions on tertiary healthcare in the sanitary macro-regions. What is behind the author's statement is the logic that rules both the concepts of economy of scale and economy of scope. The economy of scale concerns the returns when the fixed costs drops as the volume of services rise. The economy of scope concerns the returns when more types of services are provided in the same health assistance location.

In consonance with the logic above and with one of the State's mains commitments for achieving a higher-level of HDI, the reduction of the child mortality rate (MINAS GERAIS, 2003), the Programa Viva Vida (Viva Vida Program) aimed to systematize actions that so far were performed disjointedly, ambitioning to reduce child and maternal mortality rates (MMR) in the State of Minas Gerais. Having the cooperation between the Government and Organized Civil Society as its principal strategy, the program's backbone lies on The Rede Viva Vida (Viva Vida Network), a women and children's health assistance network (MINAS GERAIS, 2003).

In the face of this ambition, the State drew as a goal for the period of 2003 to 2006 a reduction of 25% of the child mortality rate (CMI) and a 15% reduction of the Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) (MINAS GERAIS, 2012). With its continuity in the quadrennium 2007-2010, the Viva Vida Program assumed the status of Structuring Project and had its goals reviewed for a drop of 15% in both the CMI and MDR (MINAS GERAIS, 2012). In order to understand the relevance of the Programa Viva Vida, as well as the goals concerning the reduction of the rates above, the next session unveils some of the main aspects of child mortality, and its history in Brazil.

3.2 The child mortality issue.

It is a hard job to measure the life quality of society fully; however, one can do it through indicators in specific areas considered as essential parts for outlining the social welfare (THE WORLD BANK, 1995). In the sphere of public health, health statistics have been used as sources of analysis for characterizing society's life conditions. Among these indicators, stands the child mortality rate (CMR). This indicator not only expresses the health levels of a society but its socio-economical pattern as well, being widely used as an indicator that synthesizes development (SZWARCWALD, 1997).

Defined by international standards, the CMR is globally understood as the number of child fatalities concerning children younger than a year old, divided by the number of live births and then multiplied by 1.000, indicating the risk of a live-born child progressing to death. The CMR is broadly used for the definition of child health public policies. Its decrease is part of the Millennium Development Goals, a United Nations' commitment to reaching acceptable living standards for the world's population (UNITED NATIONS, 2000)

Child mortality is an issue that involves numerous factors (RAVALLION, 2011), such as biological, cultural, social and flaws of the health system, and therefore, actions that aim to reduce it, depend both on structural changes concerning the population's living standards, and

direct actions defined by public health policies (FRANÇA; LANSKY, 2016). França and Lansky (2016) highlight that the comprehension of the occurrence of child mortality requires the analysis of the CMR through two main components: neonatal mortality (0 to 27 days of life) and post-natal (28 days to 1 year). The neonatal mortality component is then divided in early neonatal mortality (0 to 6 days of life) and late neonatal mortality (7 to 27 days) (FRANÇA; LANSKY, 2016).

A substantial decrease in CMR occurred since World War II in most developing countries due to improvements in standards of living and public health activities, from national and international scope (HILL; PEBLEY, 1989; IBGE 1999). In the American continent, the child mortality rate has significantly dropped, going from an average of 90, 34 fatalities of children younger than one year old per 1000 live births in the 1950s to an average of 31, 31 in the 1990s (DE CASTRO MOREIRA, 2010, ANDRADE *et al.,* 2006). The Brazilian reality since the 1980s is also of decrease concerning the CMR, diminishing from 82, 8 per 1000 live births in 1980 to 15.3 per 1000 live births in 2011, as seen in Figure 3. In 2018, the CMR per 1000 live births was 12, 4 according to the "Tábua Completa De Mortalidade Para O Brasil" (IBGE, 2018)

Figure 3 – Child mortality rates per regions, Brazil, 1980-2011



Source: Statistical Series IBGE – Child Mortality Rate five-year (1980-1990), annual (1997-2008), IPEA Data (2009-2011)

Concerning the State of Minas Gerais specifically, the SES-MG revealed an 11,5% decrease in the CMR from 1998 to 2000, going from 23,5 to 20,79 fatalities of children younger than one year old per 1000 live births (MINAS GERAIS, 2004). De Castro Moreira (2010)

points out that in the following years, the CMR decreased from 17,97 in 2002 to 14,87 in 2007. More recent data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, 2017) shows that the CMR went from 14, 70 in 2008 in the State of Minas Gerais, to 11, 43 per 1000 live births in 2017.

Despite the progress in reducing the CMR over the years, França and Lansky (2016) state that the current levels are still very high compared to other international contexts. The authors highlight that the current Brazilian child mortality rate is similar to that of developed countries in the late 1960s, being 3 to 6 times higher than countries such as Cuba, Chile, and Costa Rica with rates ranging from 3 to 10 per 1000 live births. Still on this subject, the World Health Organization (WHO) established that acceptable child mortality rates are lower than two digits (WHO, 2015). In light of this information, the CMR levels in national and State contexts are still not acceptable. This scenario indicates the need for formulation of concrete and well-planned public policies, capable of setting in motion multiple actions that perform in-depth and critical analysis of the child mortality rates, casting light not only on cause of death but also on general life standards (DE CASTRO MOREIRA, 2010; CALDEIRA *et al.,* 2002).

3.2.1 The Viva Vida Program against child mortality

From the acknowledgment that many deaths of women and children could be avoided through effective family planning; actions of sexual and reproductive health care; high quality prenatal, labor and puerperium care; attention to child health; the incentive to breastfeeding, vaccination and control of childhood prevalent illness, the Viva Vida Program structured the Viva Vid-a Network (Figure 4) (MARQUES; SOUZA; MOREIRA, 2009).

Figure 4 - Organizational Scheme of the Viva Vida Network, Minas Gerais, 2010



Source: De Castro Moreira *et al* (2012)

To provide the services as mentioned above, the State established the Viva Vida Network as a network composed of health care locations distributed following the level of complexity they demand (DE CASTRO MOREIRA *et al.,* 2012). The duty of coordinating this network was delegated to primary health care (APS), composed by the Primary Health Care Units (UAPS), also known as the Basic Units of Health (UBS). The Viva Vida Centers of Secondary Referral (CVV), the secondary normal and high-risk maternity wards, the Support Houses for Pregnant and Puerperal (CAGEP), the Neonatal Unities of Progressive Care and the micro-regional pediatric hospitals are part of the secondary health care level. The tertiary high-risk maternity wards, the CAGEP, the Neonatal Unities of Progressive Care, and the macro-regional hospitals compose the tertiary health care level.

De Castro Moreira (2010) also highlights the support and logistic systems that cut across this network. The first is formed by the Information Systems, the pharmaceutical assistance provided by the Programa Farmácia de Minas, and the micro and macro-regional laboratories that provide diagnostic support. The latter encompasses the State Regulation System (SUSFácil), the State System of Health Transport, the electronic health record, and the SUS card.

Marques, Souza & Moreira (2009) stresses that the CVV are innovative and fundamental tools for the success and consolidation of the network, defining them as micro-

regional health care locations, built and equipped with resources provided by the Treasury of the State. In this sense, The CVV are directly responsible for reducing the CMR and the MMR by the action in two fronts: providing integral care to sexual and reproductive health based on gender and reproductive rights, and providing attention to child health, especially the ones in risky situations. Actions are focused on promoting early diagnosis and recovery from illness and aggravations, through qualified and humanized attention (MARQUES; SOUZA; MOREIRA. 2009).

The Plano Plurianual de Ação Governmental (Multiannual Government Action Plan) (PPAG) 2008- 2011established the creation of 47 Viva Vida Centers by 2011. However, as seen in Figure 5, up until February of 2014, 36 CVV were implanted in the State of Minas Gerais.

Figure 5 – Distribution Map of the Viva Vida Centers of Secondary Referral by micro-region



Source: SES-MG, 2014

Funding for the services performed by Viva Vida Centers comes from the State (MINAS GERAIS, 2015). An overall budget approach is employed, setting aside the pay per procedure logic and establishing a welfare model based on service demand, as the amount of offered services per CVV is estimated based on preset parameters in literature, and the resources to fund them are calculated and hired through a Commitment and Goals Agreement. The full

transfer of resources depends on the CVV's performance concerning the pre-established goals (DE CASTRO MOREIRA, 2010).

To provide the services, Resolution No. 759/05, encompassing all the Viva Centers, specified minimum requirements concerning staff, physical structure, and equipment. De Castro Moreira (2010) expresses that tools were developed aiming to monitor structural, process, and results indicators in light of the goals set in the Commitment and Goals Agreement. However, the author denotes the lack of instruments capable of unfolding the goals and explaining how assistance is provided.

Immersed in a broad network that provides health services to children and women in all three levels of health, the health professionals of the Vida Vida Centers are responsible for mitigating child and maternal mortality rates through their active and direct service while under significant restraints of resources

The complexity of child mortality (RAVALLION, 2011) combined with its national and international appeal, as it synthesizes a country's State of development, the extensive network these professionals are part of, and the pressure for good outcomes over such individuals put the Viva Vida Centers' street levels bureaucrats in a very similar context of those studied by Lavee and Cohen (2019) and Frish-Aviram, Cohen and Beeri (2017).

4 METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES

The methodological procedures concern the structuring of the research procedures that will be employed to carry out the present study. This section encompasses the techniques, and tools for data collection and analysis, presenting the chosen methodological path and its grounds and how the study was operationalized.

4.1 Choice of study units

Due to the relatively good results in child mortality mitigation in the last years (BORGES; PINTO, 2016; TEMÓTEO, 2019) and greater possibility of access, the South East Macro-Region was chosen for this research amongst the fourteen macro-regions of the State of Minas Gerais. The South East Macro-Region as seen in Figure 6, is formed by the Viçosa, Manhuaçu and Ponte Nova micro-regions. The macro-region encompasses fifty-four municipalities, with an overall population estimated in 694.964 people, covering and area of approximately 15.168,4 km² (MINAS GERAIS, 2014).

Figure 6 – Geographic location of the researched macro-region in the State of Minas Gerais



Source: Prepared by the author based on PDR/ SES-MG 2019

Nine municipalities form the micro-region of Viçosa, with an overall population estimated in 136.886 people, it covers an area of 1.898,6 km² (MINAS GERAIS, 2014). The micro-regions of Manhuaçu is composed by the twenty-three municipalities, with and overall population estimated in 340.735 people, and covers an area of 7.413,7 km² (MINAS GERAIS, 2014). The micro-region of Ponte Nova encompasses twenty-one municipalities, and with an

overall population of 217.343 people, it covers an area of 5.856,2 km² (MINAS GERAIS, 2014).

Figure 6 shows that out of the three micro-regions that compose the South East Macro-Region, only Viçosa and Manhuaçu have implanted CVVs. Therefore, this research has as object of study the street-level bureaucrats who operate in the scope of both centers present in the macro-region. Concerning the CVV of the micro-region of Viçosa the SLB are: one pediatrician; one urologist; one mastologist; two ultrasonographist; one nurse; one psychologist; one social assistant; one nutritionist; one physiotherapist; two radiology technician; one nurse technician (VIÇOSA, 2018). As for the CVV of the micro-region of Manhuaçu the SLBs are: three gynecologists; five pediatricians; one urologist; one mastologist; two ultrasonographist; one radiologist; three nurses; two psychologists; one social assistant; one nutritionist; one physiotherapist; two radiology technician; six nurse auxiliaries (MANHUAÇU, 2010). It worth noting that in the case of the micro-region of Manhuaçu, the number of hired professionals changes according to demand and the municipalities' financial availability (MANHUAÇU, 2014).

This research will encompass a time range from 2010 to 2020. The creation of PMDI, and the Viva Vida Program and Network sets 2003 as the first year in which integrated and systemized actions aiming to mitigate child mortality in the Minas Gerais began to take place. However, 2010 is the year CVV Manhuaçu was implemented, followed by CVV Viçosa in 2011.

4.2 Data collection techniques

Concerning the research's data, primary and secondary sources were used. Primary data came from semi-structured interviews and questionnaires. Aiming to achieve this research`s goals, the semi-structured interviews and questionnaires were carried out with the Viva Viva Center's street level bureaucrats, described in the previous session.

4.2.1 Questionnaires

Due to its characteristics that allow one to gather information fixated and conditioned by a pattern of preset alternatives, questionnaires were chosen. In operational terms, the questionnaires (Appendix A) were constructed through Google Forms (docs.google.com/form), and the questions were formulated based on the previously set goals. They were sent to all thirty-four street-level bureaucrats from both centers via e-mail and were available from

October 23rd, 2020, up to November 23rd, 2020. Out of the thirty-four SLB's that work in both centers, fifteen responded the questionnaires (a 44% response rate).

Apart from gathering valuable information on the previously set categories, the questionnaires were structured to filter potential key informants for the first interviews.

4.2.2 Bibliographic research

The bibliographic research was carried out through the research of papers published in national and international journals, conferences, theses and dissertation on the researched topic. The bibliographic research not only provided the grounds for the theoretical framework but also provided insights for the discussion of results.

4.2.3 Interviews

Within qualitative research, in-depth interviews are one of the existing data collection tools and one of the primary sources of information for this kind of study. In this study, semi-structured interviews were chosen, aiming to benefit from a previously structured script (Appendix B) with central questions, with the possibility of adding other questions as the interview is carried out, this way the possibility of clarifying situations, attitudes, and behaviors is attained, getting from interviewees opinions that are rich in the details (DUARTE, 2004; MATTOS, 2005).

The applied questionnaires worked as a filter, helping to sort out among the respondents that could potentially contribute to this research. The interviews started with the SLB's that, through their questionnaire answers, revealed intention and/or previous engagement in entrepreneurial action as leaders or part of a network, aiming to mitigate the problems they have spotted within the child mortality prevention public policy.

After the first interviews, the research's sampling occurred through the Snowball sampling technique. The Snowball technique is a non-probabilistic sampling technique in which the first participants of the study (key informants or seeds) help to establish a chain of references by providing referrals for the recruitment of new participants with the best profile for the research (VINUTO, 2014; BALDIN; MUNHOZ, 2011). The number of participants was defined through saturation sampling, meaning that the processing of new observations and recruitment of new participants was interrupted, to the extent that they no longer provided further and relevant information to the research (FONTANELLA *et al.,* 2011).

Table 4 resumes the information on the interviewee. To safeguard their anonymity, no specific personal characteristics of the interviewees are displayed in this research. In this light, the participants are mentioned by their individual labels expressed in Table 3

Table 3 – Interviewees labeling

Label	Occupation	Municipality
Interviewee 1 (I1)	Former Manager	Manhuaçu
Interviewee 2 (I2)	Nurse	Manhuaçu
Interviewee 3 (I3)	Former manager	Manhuaçu
Interviewee 4 (I4)	Psychologist	Manhuaçu
Interviewee 5 (I5)	Nutritionist	Manhuaçu
Interviewee 6 (I6)	Nurse	Manhuaçu
Interviewee 7 (I7)	Nurse	Viçosa
Interviewee 8 (I8)	Nutritionist	Viçosa
Interviewee 9 (I9)	Physiotherapist	Viçosa
Interviewee 10 (I10)	Former manager	Viçosa
Interviewee 11 (I11)	Social Assistant	Viçosa

Source: Prepared by the author

The respondents consented to the interview through the *Termo de Consentimento Livre Esclarecido*, and the average time of the interviews was of fifty minutes. Due to the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the interviews were carried out remotely, seven via Google Meet and four via cellphone. They took place from November 26th, 2020, up to February 22nd, 2021. All the interviews were recorded with previous authorizations of participants and later transcribed. According to Clark et al. (2017), the transcription produces valid verbatim written records of an interview, including errors in spoken words, pauses, slangs, utterances, stutters, and colloquialisms. As this research is written in English and the interviews were conducted in Portuguese, interview translations aimed for semantic and conceptual equivalence (MARÍN; MARÍN, 1991). As recommended by Olson (2011), data coding was carried out in the source language (Portuguese).

Although it might be a small sample of interviews, the respondents are good representatives of the class of respondents important to target once this work aimed to unveil the conditions, actions, and personality traits surrounding policy entrepreneurship among professional SLB.

4.3 Data analysis technique

The data collected through interviews and questionnaires went under a qualitative analysis known as content analysis, as specified in the next session.

4.3.1 Content analysis

Content analysis was used as a data analysis technique. According to Bardin (2011), content analysis can be understood as a set of communication analysis techniques that uses systematic and objective procedures for the description of contents present in messages. Furthermore, for Laville & Dionne (1999, p.214, our translation), "content analysis displays the structure and the elements of such content to clarify its different characteristics and extract its meaning," therefore enabling a dense analysis (BARDIN, 2002).

Operationalization of the analysis was carried out following the three steps proposed by Bardin (2011), encompassing: (*i*) pré-analysis, involving the organization, operationalization, and systematization of the information collected through the interviews and all collected material; (*ii*) exploration or analysis of the material, carrying out codification with the use of Atlas TI and Nvivo software and categorization resulting from the theoretical framework ; (*iii*) treatment of results, inference, and interpretation, resulting in reflection based on empirical sources, therefore establishing connections between reality and the theoretical framework.

Aiming to analyze the content so support could be offered to the construction of this work, Table 4 aligns each specific objective to the categories, subcategories, and data collection procedures.

Table 4– Objectives and analysis categories

Objective	Categories	Subcategories	Literature
Identify under what organizational and political environment street-levels bureaucrats will engage in entrepreneurial actions	Conditions that prompt SLB to act as policy entrepreneurs seeking to change policy	A crisis, lack of effective knowledge; demand for political activism; the format of governance regime; indicators; events; crisis, and symbols; feedback from government actions; technical feasibility; economic feasibility; national mood, organized political forces, changes within government.	Kingdom (2003) Lavee and Cohen (2019) Frish-Aviram, Cohen & Beeri (2017)
Identify what actions street-level bureaucrats adopt in order to change policy	Actions street-level bureaucrats adopt to increase their influence on policy design?	Coalitions, search for knowledge, knowledge sharing, creation of media awareness, pilot projects, empowerment of believers, convincement of non-believers, consultation of experienced colleagues	Frish-Aviram, Cohen & Beeri (2017) Lavee and Cohen (2019)
Understand what are the attributes that explain the success or failure of street-level bureaucrats policy entrepreneurs	Crucial elements to the process of policy entrepreneurship	Social acuity, attention to problem definition, team building, leading by example	Mintrom & Norman (2009)

Source: Prepared by the authors.

5 RESULTS

By assessing the questionnaires and interviews, this work found a bureaucrat who engaged in entrepreneurial strategies to shape the policy she delivered. Interviewee 3 (I3) was found to have engaged in strategies that can be defined as entrepreneurial by the vast policy entrepreneurship literature (LAVEE; COHEN, 2019; FRISCH-AVIRAM, COHEN; BEERI, 2017; ZAHARIADIS 2008; MINTRON; NORMAN, 2009).

5.1 The case of I3

The case highlighted here is of participant I3, former manager of Manhuaçu's Viva Vida Center. During its implementation in 2010, up until 2017, the bureaucrat successfully pushed her vision on what the center's services should be like by outlining a long-term work plan, closely following the center's physical structuring, choosing professionals aligned with her vision, acting to expand the number of beneficiaries and services, and putting in place a lateral governance administration system.

I3 created a fertile ground for proactive professionals who helped her lead the service towards a vision developed during eight years as primary health coordinator. She ultimately affected policy design to safeguard assistance to a specific group when a change in policy left them unassisted. Thus the case is chronologically divided into two distinct moments, considering the policy process literature (Laswell, 1948, 1965; deLeon 1999; May and Wildavsky 1978; Jenkins 1978).

The first moment took place at the implementation level, when the SLB, as mentioned above, personally delineated and implemented all the necessary aspects for the Center's implementation. Drawing from Roberts (1992), it is understood that I3 was the policy champion for the Viva Vida Center in Manhuaçu. Aware of what the policy represented for the macro-region, she championed the initiative, securing a smooth path for the policy's implementation. The bureaucrat's endeavor in upbringing the CVV Manhuaçu is marked by her personal effort to promote a quality and innovative service, to the extent that secondary care to women and children in the macro-region lacked before the initiative.

The second and final moment of the case happened within the agenda-setting phase. The bureaucrat effectively went up the bureaucratic ladder to argue for the reinsertion of sexual violence and abuse victims in the scope of the policy. Guided by Kingdom (2003), this work argues that by doing so, the bureaucrat assumed the role of a policy entrepreneur and

successfully brought to the State Government's attention the importance of assisting victims of sexual violence and abuse. In light of the various constraints, SLBs are subject to, which might be why they have been away from being seen as potential entrepreneurs for so long (ARNOLD, 2015), and guided by the literature on policy entrepreneurship and street-level bureaucracy discussed in the previous sections, the next session presents the conditions that prompted the bureaucrat, as well as the used strategies and the traits that might have enabled her to succeed in her effort.

Last but not least, the case of I3 is also important as it allows casting light on street-level management. Gassner And Gofen (2018) argue that although holding a critical structural position, street-level management has been overlooked within the well-established scholarly traditions. Street-level managers (SLM) are between decision-makers and the local public; they exert great discretion to change and put in place formal policies into street-level implementation (GASSNER; GOFEN, 2018). The authors explain that such a position entails challenges; SLM are often accountable to central and local governments while translating formal policy decisions to street-level work before implementation and adapting them after. In this sense, Gassner And Gofen (2018) provide valuable insights on street-level management, enabling one to better the nature and role of I3's position as an SLM.

5.1.1 Elements that prompted I3

Aware that I3 engaged in entrepreneurial strategies to shape the policy behind the CVV Manhuaçu, during implementation and posteriorly in the agenda-setting phase, it is crucial to understand the organizational and political conditions that prompted her to do so.

Scholars have long pointed out that SLB can go out of their way to safeguard pet policies outcomes at the micro-level. This happens, mainly because they can. Lipsky (2010) points that SLBs hold great power on what must or must not be carried out during implementation and service delivering. Concerning this power, Ferreira and Medeiros (2016) points that bottom-up scholarly tradition argues on behalf of discretion, placing it as an unavoidable element of the bureaucratic function and even a desirable feature, as it enables SLBs to adapt policies to individual needs.

The reason for such a favorable perspective on discretion lies in the argument that public policies are often formulated in a centralized way to be homogeneously implemented, leading to situations in which rules can be vague, ambiguous and/or contradictory (LOTTA; PAVEZ, 2010). Even in this scenario, SLBs must do their jobs and translate such rules into products and

services, going further from the objectives set in policy formulation because formulators, many times, do not know what they want (OLIVEIRA, 2012). Thus, in light of such insights from the literature, the power SLBs hold to interpret rules and shape services seems intrinsic to their activity, so they can maintain progress in policy implementation.

The discussion above is relevant to the findings of this work once the elements found to have prompted I3 are within the scope of rules and guidelines for implementation, the exertion of discretion, and centralized policy formulation (reformulation in I3's specific case)

In the first moment of the case, two main elements were found to have startled the street-level bureaucrat to champion the Viva Vida Center: lack of guidelines for implementation, carte blanche given by the local authority. As for the second moment, top-down policy change seems to have put the bureaucrat on the policy entrepreneur path.

A) Lack of guidelines for implementation.

Within the Viva Vida Network, the Viva Viva Centers are part of a state-run policy; therefore, the protocols, guidelines, and staff training were to be fully provided by the Health State Secretariat of Minas Gerais (SES-MG). But that does not seem to have been the case once the lack of State orientation during the Viva Vida Centers' implementation appears to be common ground among all participants.

I7, I10, and I8 highlighted the lack of State coordination during the Vida Vida Centers' implementation by contrasting the State's attention and coordination towards the Hiperdia Center of secondary referral for diabetes and hypertension in Viçosa MG. While the State provided technical visits and precise, updated guidelines and protocols for the Hiperdia Center, the CVV was neglected. I7 states that both centers were very "discrepant, although two services with very close philosophies treating different diseases and functioning within the same space, there is a big difference between them."

The State did provide training for the centers` staff in the initial months following implementation. However, it took place in Belo Horizonte MG, requiring the team to commute constantly, making it difficult for them to conciliate it with their daily tasks, causing a high rate of non-participation, as stated by I7. Furthermore, the structure provided was not ideal. As I5 points out, many classes that were supposed to have taken place during the training did not happen, disabling the professionals to complete training.

Within this scenario, I3 reports taking on an empty set, "I got an empty building, do you understand? Literally empty, empty of equipment, empty of proposals, empty of flows, empty

of protocols." However, the former manager faced the lack of guidance and protocols as an opportunity. Although frightened by assuming an empty set, the bureaucrat states that she saw an opportunity to outline an organizational identity for the center based on quality and aiming to reach the highest number of "clients" as possible (I3).

The lack of guidance was a hindering factor that could have prevented the Center's implementation from happening smoothly. However, I3's interview reveals that what could have been an issue was faced as an opportunity. The former street-level manager compared the situation to a white canvas ready to be painted (I3), literally speaking, an opportunity ready to be seized. In this light, although a metaphor, it suggests that she was indeed ready to ride whatever came along.

Such finds reinforce the preposition that the lack of official regulations can reinforce the space of discretion (SAPAT; ESNARD, 2012; STIVERS, 2007). The absence of official government guidelines can propel the reformulation of SLB's roles and on-the-ground delivery while space for maneuver is broadened (GOFEN; LOTTA, 2021; LOTTA; VERA, 2020; MØLLER, 2021). Ultimately, the absence of concrete and systematized state guidelines for the Center's implementation prompted I3 to take matters into her own hands while providing space for her to do so.

However, the element uncovered here is no surprise, as literature, as exposed before, has pointed out how often policies formulators do not know what they want from policies, resulting in vague objectives, too generalized or as is the cases here, almost nonexistent. But on other hand, it is the empty space, left by lack of guidelines, that sustains this work's assertion that I3, in the first part of this case, took on the role of a policy champion.

Roberts (1992) provided important conceptualization for the concept of policy champion. In her perspective a policy champion in not only involved in guaranteeing smooth implementation for the initiative, but such actor also assumes the job of prototyping the innovation before implementation as well. In more specific terms, the prototype can be of technical and administrative order, with the latter encompassing the one that matters here, organizational prototypes.

As stated before, the Viva Vida Centers were innovative for the context they were to be implemented. Thus, in face of the lack of official guidelines, the street-level manager drew her own, envisioning every aspect of the Center. In the further session dedicated to the strategies I3 used, the "prototyping" is better assessed.

B) Carte blanche given by local authority

Still within the first moment of I3's case, implementation, the second element that prompted I3 was the autonomy and discretion bestowed upon her by the local authority. In this sense, the opportunity of outlining an organizational identity for the Center could only have been seized due to the free reign the bureaucrat was able to enjoy. For the former manager, the support she had from the local authority was unconditional and crucial for the success of the implementation and "keep believing the dream was possible" (I3).

For being an SLM within a state public policy context, I3 was accountable to the State and the local Government. Therefore not only the hierarchical structure of her street-level organization and its relationship with the state mattered. How the local authority understood her role and the amount of freedom she enjoyed was of great relevance for her endeavor to shape the Center's processes and outcomes. There is often the idea that policy-making and all that comes with it, like shaping and innovating on the processes, is a politician's job (FRISCH-AVIRAM, COHEN; BEERI, 2018). The bureaucrat wanted to escape such commonplace

"I wanted to fly, actually I had the will, I had autonomy, a white canvas to establish a service, and of course I wanted it to be the best service" (I3). The bureaucrat credits the privilege of such autonomy to her good relationship developed with the local government along eight years coordinating the primary health. The influence of I3 in the formation of the Center was highlighted by I1, manager of the center in 2020, and I4, psychologist of the Center since its implementation. They both pinpoint I3 as a professional who led all aspects of the Center's structuring and implementation.

The leadership of I3 during Center's implementation in Manhuaçu gets the eye, especially when compared to the implementation in Viçosa. Through the interview carried out with I10, manager of the CVV Viçosa during its first years, it became clear that the municipality's government coordinated the whole process of the Center's implementation. Although I10 was responsible for drafting the proposal for the Center, it was the local health secretary who took responsibility for coordinating and supervising the purchase of equipment for the center. At the same time, the mayor personally hired the staff that would compose the CVV Viçosa. I10 was not involved in structuring the center, either physically or professionally.

In Manhuaçu, I3 freely led and supervised all equipment purchases and staff selection. This was crucial for the bureaucrat once they were the first actions the former manager took to secure her vision for the center, making sure the Center's infrastructure was up to par to the

level of quality she expected to deliver and that the hired professionals were on board with her plan.

The freedom the former manager enjoyed recalls the findings of Frisch-Aviram, Cohen & Beeri (2018). The study found that SLBs may find more accessible paths to act as entrepreneurs within less traditional and more governance-oriented administrative systems. A shift from a conservative public administration to lateral governance positively impacted street-level bureaucrats engaging in policy entrepreneurship, casting light on how shifts in the political stream might affect SLPEs.

While standard policy entrepreneurs navigate higher instances of power, very often the national level, I3 dealt with the local and state political atmosphere. The State`s weak presence in implementation and the high level of freedom conceded by the local authority were, as already stated, enablers for I3`s endeavors to shape the Center`s implementation and service provision. However, such a multilevel relationship can get complicated, as it did in I3`s case. Contradictory political mandates and state and municipal governments run by two different parties ended up undermining the discretion I3 once enjoyed.

Initially, a shift in State government from the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) administration to the Worker's Party (PT) in 2015 (TRE-MG, 2014) culminated in the Center's reform. It became the State Center for Specialized Attention (CEAE) in October of 2015, resulting in important changes in the service portfolio. Later, in 2016, a shift in the local government put in place the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) administration and a new health secretary.

According to I5, the change in State government resulted in the weakening of the bonds between the Center and the State, "before it, the bonds were tighter (…) the ones in power were the ones who outlined the policy" (I5). I5 reports that until the new local administration in 2016 assumed office, the State administration elected in 2015 completely neglected the Center. The nutritionist reported that the new local administration, more specifically the new health secretary of the time, undermined all the autonomy the Center held. "They wanted to do everything in their own way, and to do so, they had to remove her from office" (I5). Therefore, the free reign I3 once enjoyed crumbled due to political shifts, culminating in her removal from office.

Finding out that the discretion the SLM enjoyed prompted and enabled her to champion the CVV goes toward what bottom-up scholars have already conveyed. Earlier in this work, it was discussed how the discretionary element is taken as intrinsic to street-level bureaucracy.

The result expressed is this section goes towards such argument, as the power I3 held to outline organizational procedures and allocate resources secured a smoother implementation of the innovation she aimed to foster. However, the scenario in CVV Viçosa, opposite to CVV Manhuaçu discretion-wise, touches on a reflection by Ferreira and Medeiros (2016). While discretion is taken as intrinsic and a potentially benefic element to street-level bureaucracy and policy implementation, the effects of its omission in concrete situations due to personal, professional, or administrative motives (the case here) needs attention. For Ferreira and Medeiros (2016), the omission can affect policy outcomes, but even so, literature does not seem to be very keen on looking into it, given the lack of studies on the matter.

C) Top-down change in policy

The third element that prompted the bureaucrat to engage in entrepreneurial action to shape the policy was a top-down change within policy. A few years later, after implementation, when I3 became aware that a specific group of clients was left unassisted by a change in policy design, she engaged use entrepreneurial strategies to fill the existent gap and provide the services needed by the "clients" (I3). Thus, here, the second moment of I's case is at analysis, the one that took place in a different stage of the policy process, the agenda-setting.

It is important here to elucidate the chain of events that prompted I3 into the actions described above and briefly mentioned in the previous section. The kick start event was a political turnover that put in place in State Government a party opposed to the one previous in power. As Kingdom (2003) argues, political turnover can represent windows of opportunity for inserting or, as is the case here, remove issues from the official governmental agenda. Therefore, as the state of Minas Gerais underwent a change in government, the public policy that originated the Viva Vida Centers was altered at the institutional level.

Resolution Nº 759 from October 2005 established that all CVVs were to assist women victimized by sexual abuse and violence (MINAS GERAIS, 2005). However, I3 stated that CVV Manhuaçu was the only center out of 28 that assumed the service portfolio in its full scope. For I5, the center's social assistant, the other centers overlooked the sexual abuse and violence issue, acting as if it did not exist. Participant I4 believes that the other municipalities ignored the issue due to its complexity, being too much of a sensitive topic that professionals at the time did not know how or were not prepared to approach.

The fact is that CVV Manhuaçu put in place a network that assisted women and children victimized by sexual abuse and violence. I4, who led the formation of the network, reported

that the experience was so successful that along the line, the center's professionals provided training for some other centers on the issue, based on their case of success.

However, the path was not smooth. The change in State Government in 2015 almost put an end to the service provided to the victims of sexual violence almost as soon as it started. Resolution Nº 4.971 from October 21st restructured the center, reshaping it into the Center for Specialized Attention (CEAE) (MINAS GERAIS, 2015). The resolution removed the assistance to sexually abused women and children from the services portfolio, leaving the group unassisted. I4 words:

> As soon as we started the training, there was a change in politics and turn-around in direction, so we were a little bit lost because we had started the work, we had a proposal but we no longer had support, there was a change in direction at state level, because we got to the point were the service was no longer funded by the SUS, the assistance was a procedure no longer funded by the State (I4).

"I said, 'we cannot accept that" (I3). Worried about where the women and children would be assisted once the Center no longer had the resources to do so, the former manager decided to go up the bureaucratic ladder to revert the policy design change. The bureaucrat reported initially engaging in phone conversations with the SES MG to argue against the shift in the service portfolio. Communication then proceeded to official letters, in which I3 reported exposing to state officials how vital the assistance they were providing to the victims of sexual abuse was, technically arguing for the return of the service to the portfolio.

The former manager stated that the State could not answer where the women and children would be assisted. Eventually, I3 decided the Center and the professionals would not cease assisting the victims and informed the State the service would go on. According to I5, terminating the service would leave An important gap in assistance. In I2 words:

> We informed the state that we would continue to do it because it would be a catastrophe for these services for these people for these individuals that we were assisting. They would simply be left there to their won luck will in a municipality that had no knowledge that had no sensitivity that we already had to do this work, where will these patients be treated and with that kind of quality? So even though the entire network had been made aware of this situation, they needed a team to concentrate these services and give this feedback to the municipality, guiding what would be done, increasing this complementary service in the municipality (I2).

One year after the first negotiations with the State, women, and children victimized by sexual abuse and violence were reintroduced to the service portfolio. However, the initiative that started through the efforts of I4 and was advocated by I3 remained without support from the State. The Center would not be punished for providing a service outside the portfolio once

it was included back in. Still, the initiative went on without any kind of training provided by the State to guide the professionals on dealing with the issue. I2 and I5 credited the State's lack of interest in the issue to the fact that most centers did not give due relevance to the problem, generating a blind spot within the policy.

On why having advocated for the service even though most centers did not provide it, I3 stated that she felt she needed to be a voice for those who were voiceless, in a moment in were the right thing to do was to stand up for the rights of those who did not even know how to pursue such rights. The bureaucrat highlights that even though it was a very sensitive and complex issue, she never saw it as a burden but rather as a door that the State was shutting.

It was already exposed in the previous section that the political turnover at the local level culminated in I3's removal from office. However, in light of the facts described in the previous and in this section, even before that, the political turnover at the state level began to change her reality within the organization she ran, first with the weakening of bonds with state bureaucracy and then with the elimination of the victims of sexual abuse and violence issue from the policy goals. This might reveal a reduction in the SLM's power to take matters into her own hands; although she resisted the change, as explained further in this work, she saw herself with no other option but to go up the bureaucratic ladder to advocate for change. The conditions that once were almost ideal began to shift with the political turnover.

5.1.2 Adopted entrepreneurial strategies

Our findings show that Interviewee 3 was a proactive professional who, beyond being committed to work, adopted entrepreneurial strategies to foster the CVV Manhuaçu, shaping its organizational identity, creating a smoother implementation path, and securing policy outcomes. Posteriorly, in a second moment when conditions changed, the SLM went up the bureaucratic ladder aiming to promote policy change more broadly when women and children victimized by sexual abuse and violence were left unassisted.

Roberts (1992) does not assess policy champions in terms of the strategies they use, but rather the stages of the policy process they are involved in. In fact, works like Bartlett and Dibben (2002), Windrun and Koch (2008), and Lima and Medeiros (2012) maintain that policy champions and policy entrepreneurs are concepts very similar to one another, sometimes even using both terms interchangeably. Howell, She and Higgins (2005) developed an instrument to analyze champions behaviors and came up with a set of fifteen actions that reflected champion behavior, being all of them connected to how champions advocate for innovation they are

supporting. In fact, such characteristics are almost entirely a mix of the strategies and profile characteristics describe in policy entrepreneurship literature,

In this sense, although this work does understand that in the first moment of this case, I3 was a champion and not a policy entrepreneur, it sticks to the strategies Lavee and Cohen (2019) and Frish-Aviram, Cohen, and Beeri (2017). Therefore, assessed by the categories stablished in Table 4 this work sough to unveil such strategies. With regards to the first moment discussed in this case, the identified strategies were: process planning, vision diffusion; team leadership. As for the second moment in this case, the identified strategy was: gathering evidence to show workability.

Although identified separately, the hybrid use of the strategies identified by Frisch-Aviram (2019) was also identified here in the processing planning and vision diffusion strategies.

A) Problem Framing

Classic literature on policy entrepreneurship conveys that policy entrepreneurs define problems through a broad set of information (MINTRON; NORMAN, 2009). As the classical policy entrepreneur is located in higher instances of governments, indicators, feedback from governmental action, focus events, and major crisis are the elements that bring their attention to a specific issue (KINGDOM, 2003). However, with the perspective shifted to a lower instance, it was noticed that elements that caught the eye toward the issue were a little closer to "home." I3`s problem definition was much more related to daily experiences, resumed in service provision routine, and frequent interaction with clients.

Having worked in the coordination of primary health for eight years, the bureaucrat reported that at the time, the services reached around four hundred thousand people within the macro-region of Manhuaçu (I3). However, during this period, the interviewee perceived that the primary health attention, although a significant support point for the macro-region, was not enough to secure the SUS's integrality. In this sense, I3 stated that the assistance gap concerning secondary care in the macro-region generated a persistent and recurrent demand brought by clients that needed assistance beyond the primary health structure.

In this vein, Lu et al. (2020) point out that the role of delivering a policy can bring a greater perception of the challenges and gaps that arise from the interaction of a policy with the street-level context. For the authors, the street-level bureaucrats are then prompted to respond

even when they have little or no resources at hand. Therefore, the nature of their response is deeply based on their knowledge of policy problems and context (MATLAND, 1995).

For Lavee and Cohen (2019), closeness to the field can enhance one's ability to identify social needs (LAVEE; COHEN 2019) precisely. In this regard, the precise problem definition is a primary and essential element, as errors occur more often due to a poor definition of a problem than an inadequate solution (SUBIRATS, 2006).

Accordingly, the former manager's daily contact with primary health professionals and clients who needed secondary attention but had nowhere to be assisted raised her awareness of an issue that needed attention. The closeness to the demand and daily confrontation with such a gap shaped I3's vision of a quality secondary health service in the macro-region. Moreover, although not responsible for designing the policy itself, the bureaucrat's personal experience heavily shaped her vision of the identity she wanted to impress in Manhuaçu`s CVV. The former manager stated that through the CVV, she "wanted to answer a demand that happened all the time, I wanted to honor the role of the secondary attention" (I3). Thus, the bureaucrat envisioned and shaped a service that would provide integral assistance for the clients, answering the macro region's needs she perceived in the previous years working as coordinator of the primary health.

Problem definition is typically followed by seeking a solution (FRISCH-AVIRAM; BEERI; COHEN, 2020), but in I3`s case, the solution fell on her lap. The state of Minas Gerais created the policy that originated the Viva Vida Centers, and the Municipality put her in charge of coordinating its implementation at the local level. However, for her, the Center needed to answer the demand she had spotted over the years effectively. In this light, the findings suggest that the former manager's contextual knowledge allowed her to understand the issue thoroughly. When it became a problem addressed by the government, she managed to couple the solution to the problem at the ground level. This coupling was materialized through a long-term plan for the center, taking account of the key organizational aspects of the CVV Manhuaçu., highly influenced by her vision formed through contextual knowledge.

The interesting thing here is that, through Kingdom (2003) perspective, problem framing belongs to the agenda-setting phase, that after being coupled with a solution in a favorable political moment, is inserted in the official agenda. But in the case of the SLM, the problem framing occurred within the implementation phase. In fact, such accurate problem framing at the implementation level enhanced the prototyping of the center's organizational structure. While for Subirats (2006) accurate problem framing is important for the choice of

appropriate solutions, here in the first moment of I3's case, knowing exactly what the problem was enabled her to refine her prototyping process, tuning the organizational structure to be established with the problem the Viva Vida Centers aimed to mitigate, the lack of proper secondary health assistant to women and children.

B) Process planning - Prototyping

The second identified action was **process planning.** This is strategy is not present in Table 4, but is present in managing literature. Process planning consists of a systematized process through which the manager conducts the future direction of the organization concerning its environment and demands from external stakeholders, formulating strategies, analyzing the organization's weaknesses and strengths, understanding who are the stakeholders and managing issues (BERRY, 2007; BERRY; WECHSLER, 2014).

The process planning described by the authors above echoes Roberts (1992) administrative prototype, as it also involves constructing an organizational structure. What might make the process planning carried out by I3 an administrative prototype is the moment it was outlined and the inherent innovation level it had aggregated to it.

The findings indicate that Interviewee 3 had a long-term well-outlined plan for the organization concerning its organizational aspect from the very first moment she assumed the Center's management. The bureaucrat aimed to promote CVV Manhuaçu as an organization based on her view of a quality secondary health center, securing effective policy outcomes.

According to the Center's psychologist, I4, when work started in 2010, the former manager already had every aspect of the center outlined. I3 was described as a demanding professional who made everything to secure that all services would be provided precisely the way they were supposed to be according to the service portfolio (I5).

Firmly based on the perspective built after eight years of service within the primary health level, the SLM outlined a protocol that established guidelines encompassing the patients' referral from the primary health to the secondary health, how the patient would be first assisted within the Center and how the professionals were to conduct the follow up along the time. According to I3, the goal was to secure that every patient would receive the integral care that was theirs by constitutional right. In I3 words:

> For you to have an idea, it was designed before I opened the doors of Viva Vida the way the professional was going to receive the patient, they stepped outside the office at the time of the appointment, the reception would have already warned them that the patient was waiting at the reception, it was the professional who would pick up the patient at the reception. The work of humanization began at the first moment of

> contact between the patient and the professional, regardless of being a doctor, social assistant psychologist, nurse, nutritionist, physiotherapist (I3).

After the protocols on how to receive and assist the patients were established, I3 reports that a fundamental question needed to be raised, “who are our clients?” (I3). With that in mind, the bureaucrat claimed having traveled around the macro-region of Manhuaçu to display the Center’s service portfolio to the other municipalities that were to be assisted by the organization. Her goal was to let the clientele know the service existed and was available. Such a step was crucial to I3’s plan. As Gassner and Gofen (2018) explain, a street-level organization's accomplishments are strongly linked to the engagement and compliance of the policy clients. To engage and comply, the clientele, i.e., women and children from Manhuaçu macro-region, needed to know the service existed and was available to them.

Thus, it must be considered that I3 was the first manager of CVV Manhuaçu, and got involved with it even before it opened its doors to the public. A process plan could have been carried out by the next manager, the manager after that one, and so on. However, I3’s process planning was the first one and was constructed even before implementation effectively started. The first reference the macro-region got of a Viva Vida Center was the one built by the SLB.

Another argument that might attest to the fact that I3 processing planning can be understood as an administrative prototype is how innovative the CVVs were to the context they were to be implemented in, as reported by Marques, Souza & Moreira (2009). Roberts (1992) highly stressed the innovation aspect, saying that an innovative product might bloom from an innovative prototype. In I3’s case, the final product was a fully implemented CVV, a working facility praised for its performance and innovative take on human resources management.

What might differ I3’s prototype from Robert’s prototype is that the SLB’s one came out of the paper straight to implementation; there was no test in between to deem if the design was successful or not. However, as we look into the policy process, that is a justifiable difference. Concerning public policies, policy process models often do not address “pilot” phases. The use of pilot projects for policy innovations indeed gained adherents over the last decades, but their effectiveness is still up for debate (UGHES; YORDI; BESCO, 2018; VREUGDENHIL, 2004).

When it comes to the SLMs “fixing” what is no working on implementation, such managerial function is defined by Gassner And Gofen (2018) as adaptation when bureaucrats in managing positions spot gaps during implementation and act on them.

Therefore, painting the "white canvas" in I3's context meant coming up with a clear, detailed, and consistent process plan that is elevated to the status of a prototype due to her unique position. Still, within the SLM framework, it is also important to point out that process planning can also be related to what Gassner And Gofen (2018) describe as translation, when street-level managers transform ambiguous and vague policy decisions into a detailed organizational plan for the organization, by doing so, the authors claim a manager sets the groundwork for the direct delivery of a newly introduced policy.

C) Vision diffusion

One establishes a vision of a possible future through strategic planning based on the desire to set policy direction (KANTER, 1983; BERRY; WECHSLER, 2014). So, still, within the scope of process planning, the second identified strategy was **vision diffusion.** This action consisted in the diffusion of the process plan for the organization through one on one conversations and posteriorly with workshops, revealing an intertwined use of strategies (FRISCH-AVIRAM, 2019)

I4 and I5 revealed that during the selection process, the former manager held one-on-one conversations with them. In this conversation, I3 exposed her plan for the center, stating that the path would not be easy, that work within the center was to be all about multidisciplinary teamwork, that all norms and demands were to be followed, and invited the professional to give their best to the organization (I4; I5). On this matter, I3 reports that it was an opportunity to share her vision individually with each professional and hear about their self-motivation processes, a chance to tie loose ends.

After all professionals were hired, I3 delegated I4 to promote workshops that were to be conducted in small groups that had to be formed by heterogeneous professionals. "It was about aligning concepts, we had to speak the same language, our goal was that everyone had to understand what the Vida Vida Center's proposal was" (I3). "Everyone participated, from the janitors to the doctors so that the team would be prepared, the proposal was conveyed (…) after the workshop we started working" (I4).

Within policy entrepreneurship literature, it is well known that policy entrepreneurs must be well versed concerning social interactions, as part of the process of inserting issues into the governmental agenda is made of advocating on behalf of their "innovation". Therefore, the entrepreneur must share and disseminate his ideas in the best possible way. That is also the case of champions. Being personally involved in implementing an innovative idea, champions

assume risk and seek support among their peers for the initiative (LIMA; MEDEIROS, 2012; CROSBY; STONE, 2016).

Thus, the SLM went by the book with this strategy. But what gets the eye here is the intertwined use of strategies. The diffusion of I3's vision is linked to the strategy she adopted right before, the drawing of the administrative prototype. The words of I4, "everyone had to understand what the Vida Vida Center's proposal was", elucidates that the strategy presented here consisted mainly of presenting to the staff the porotype that had been created beforehand.

In the section dedicated to pointing out the attributes related to I3's endeavor, this works highlights the attention she paid to team building, revealing that within the prototype she had come up with was also the professional profile she believed was best for the CVV Manhuaçu staff, and how she assessed such profile by questioning the candidates if they were on board with her vision.

D) Team leadership

The third identified strategy was **team leadership**. This strategy consists of actively leading team members or individuals from the policy network. The aim is to do or get the job done, mainly functions that are not being handled in an adequate way (ZACCARO; RITTMAN; MARKS, 2001)

The findings of this work show that all participants from CVV Manhuaçu recognized I3 as an active leader who dynamically managed the Center`s staff, getting involved while building a democratic space for proactivity, where every staff member's opinion mattered (I1; I2; I4; I5). More specifically, to keep motivation high and secure that the staff members would feel appreciated, I3 delegated projects to professionals to take the lead and make it happen alongside other staff members.

When asked about the governance system adopted within the CVV Manhuaçu, I3, the manager responsible for the Center's implementation reported:

> The management model I adopted, shared management, you know how my organizational chart was ? in ellipse interfacing with each other all the time, and me as leader, but I did not feel in a higher hierarchical position (...) when you adopt shared management you bring the whole team together with you, answering in a very responsible way to what is their responsibility, so the work environment is theirs and ours at the same time, and their well done work process impacts the colleague next to them, which impacts on the other and so on, so it spreads. (...) The main is the provocation, that is exactly what I wanted, from the moment that my employee, the employee that is inside my team, feels implicated to provide answers, they will look for the best possible way to solve the issues (I3).

Under I3's management, the Center was run under a delegation leadership style, in which the manager delegates trusting in their followers' abilities as they are "willing and able to take responsibility for directing their own behavior," running their "own show" (HERSHEY; BLANCHARD, 1997, p. 6).

A specific case that showed up in the interviews was the reforestation project. I3 reported having noticed that one staff member was having problems adapting to the service, generating demotivation, and affecting service performance. The former manager developed an environmental responsibility project to distribute native and fruit tree seeds to the patients assisted at the Center. The project's leadership was delegated to the professional, "I gave leadership to him and said 'you are the manager' " (I3). In I4`s perspective, although being extra work, the professionals led the projects with great pleasure due to the motivation and appreciation work behind it.

A news piece conveyed in the City Hall's website highlights the project's success, named *Reciclar e Reflorestar: Responsabilidade Viva a Vida.* The article reports that all professionals from the Center got involved in the initiative that had already donated 8.698 seeds and stressed the organization as a State reference in health assistance (MANHUAÇU, 2015).

Another unveiled case was the case of I4. The bureaucrat, after realizing the need for an integral approach to the sexual abuse and violence issue, while inserted in a governance-oriented environment, engaged in a project to bring together in-house professionals and outside institutions, updating and enhancing protocols while making sure that the individuals who needed assistance would be correctly assisted and referred throughout the network.

Under the name "Empowerment of the individual in work relations: reflexes on the quality of public health assistance", CVV Manhuaçu's experience with shared management was nominated to the InovaSUS 2015 award (MANHUAÇU, 2014; BRASIL, 2014). The award intends to highlight innovations within public health that contribute to improve the quality of assistance. Other achievements are highlighted in the same news piece, such as the *Destaque na Saúde* 2012, promoted by the East of South Health Macro Region Secretariat.

A champion's job also involves the implementation phase (ROBERTS, 1992). Thus after having "sold" her prototype to the Center's staff, through the diffusion of her vision, I3 had to secure a smooth path throughout implementation. It is argued here that by adopting a more lateral management model, allowing professionals to run their own projects, the SLM was aiming to secure the best and smoothest possible service delivery.

Participant I4's project of updating protocols and reshaping the assistance to victims of violence and sexual abuse echoes the adaption function proposed by Gassner And Gofen (2018). Although the authors refer specifically to bureaucrats in managing positions that spot gaps during implementation and act on them, more flexible management models like the ones described by I3 and Frisch-Aviram, Cohen, and Beeri (2018) might blur the decision-making lines, extrapolating the concept of adaptation to SLBs that are not in a management position. Some passages in I5's interview nods towards this argument; the bureaucrat reports that during I3's management, the staff was aware of everything and part of all decisions that went on within the Center,

> Everybody took part in all of the decisions, even if it was about a broken gutter, all professionals from the specialized staff were aware of everything (…) We knew about everything that went on within the Viva Vida, in the meeting I3 reported back to us about everything (I5)

On the other hand, the situation in CVV Viçosa differed a lot from Manhuaçu's reality. Thus the team leadership style adopted by the manager of CVV Manhuaçu gets the eyes and can be pointed as innovative within the macro-regional context.

While in CVV Manhuaçu the bureaucrats reported having the discretion to conduct projects, doing what I3 expected from them, as she reported herself; the interviews with the bureaucrats from CVV Viçosa revealed a much strict and hierarchical administrative system. I7, I8, and I9 said that the first and final word was expected to come from the Center's manager when it came to promoting projects or any other actions outside the daily routine.

I8, nutritionist of CVV Viçosa, since its implementation, stated that the most challenging aspect of conducting any project within the Center is selling the idea to the manager, "if they do not buy your idea it gets very difficult, even if you are proactive" (I8). In this sense, the interview with I9, who has been working in the Center for the last seven years, revealed a system of "tell me what to do," similar to what Hershey and Blanchard (1997) call the "telling" style, very often marked by one-way communication, in which the manager defines the roles and tell what has to be done and when, how and where. According to I7, nurse at CVV Viçosa, the actions they took to solve problems in assistance came from the urgent and momentaneous needs to do so, "every day you put out a fire" (I7). She also credited this difficulty to promote more systematized actions to the administrative system, "we did not have governability to do much" (I7).

However, after I3's removal from office in 2016 due to the shift in the politics stream discussed in session 5.1.1, the situation in CVV Manhuaçu took a turn. I5 expressed that after a change in management, interaction among professionals within the Center drastically dropped. According to her, the meetings I3 regularly held for professionals to interact and share their perspectives ceased completely. In her own words:

> So we weren't told about all the problems, because I think the less we knew, the less we could give our opinion about. And now in the last year, to give you an idea, we had two or three meetings during the whole year. So, to be able to have projects you have to have meetings, you have to have an engaged team, united, discussing, having ideas, sharing what needs to be discussed. It came a point that we didn't have the opportunity to have this anymore. If we just go to the Center, assist the patients and leave, there is no time to exchange knowledge, much less for projects or to create things beyond your daily service (I5).

The passage above is another element that attests to how the political turnover at the state and local level undermined the discretionary conditions within CVV Manhuaçu, both for I3 and the rest of the staff. Therefore, the change in management resulted in the weakening of the interactions between manager and staff, hindering project development by the staff (I5). As previously argued, such projects are related to adaptation, when changes are made during implementation to fix what is not working. As the literature points out, discretion is intrinsic to this process. Thus, the findings suggest that the loss of such element might have resulted in a less responsive and adaptive implementation process within the context of the case. This argumentation nods towards Lima and Medeiros (2016), who claim that the effects of discretion omission, by whatever cause, need to be investigated.

Another element that hints towards the argument above is the lack of side projects after the removal of I3 from office. The interviews were conducted from November 2020 to February 2021, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, even so, no signs of concrete adaptation projects carried out by the staff were found. Suggesting once again how the shift in leadership style cause by the political turnover affected the CVV Manhuaçu.

E) Gathering evidence to show workability

The fourth and last strategy identified in I3`s case was **gathering evidence to show the workability of a proposal**. This action consists of engaging with others to demonstrate the workability of a change proposal, showing "genuine commitment to improved social outcomes" (MINTROM; NORMAN, 2009).

Such strategy was identified within the second moment of the case during the negotiation I3 held with the State to reintroduce assistance to sexual violence victims in the service portfolio. Although the bureaucrat did not provide many details of the negotiation that took place, she reported that their main argument was technical. “I insisted on technical argumentation, showing every proof that the service was working” (I3).

On the matter, I5 highlighted that they believe the State let the Center go on providing the service because they showcased it was a well-structured service that shed light on a neglected demand. In addition, I5 reported that once the assistance network was established and working, a significant number of sexual abuse cases started showing up, revealing, in her opinion, how necessary it was for the other centers to engage in such an issue. Thus, the indicator on the number of cases was also very important for the success of I3’s endeavor.

As already previously stated, although the assistance of the victims of sexual violence and abuse was in the service portfolio in the initial policy design, most centers did not provide such service, making it a particularity of CVV Manhuaçu. In this sense, CVV Manhuaçu led by example, showing commitment to improving the policy's social outcomes. For Quinn (2000), this can do a lot in terms of winning credibility, serving as leverage for negotiation with legislators. In addition, when entrepreneurs take action and advocate for changes aiming at better social outcomes as I3 did, it can make the higher instances look out of touch, making legislators switch from a focus on the consequences of actions to a focus on the consequences of their inactions (MINTROM, 1997; MINTROM; NORMAN, 2009).

In this sense, in the face of the strong case made by I3 concerning how vital the assistance to the victims was, and how much demand there was, and how the Center was successfully targeting it, the reintroduction of the service in the service portfolio suggest that State understood that neglecting the victims of sexual abuse would not go unchallenged.

Under the lenses of the Multiple Streams, what took place in the second moment of this case was the reinsertion of a problem within the state Government agenda. The sexual violence and abuse against women and children issue was within the scope of the original policy that originated the Viva Vida Centers. Due to the political turnover at the State level, the issue seemed to have been removed from the agenda, and as the policy was reformulated and the CVV’s turned into CEAEs, women and children victimized by sexual abuse and violence were left outside of the new service portfolio. Unlike the first moment of the case, in which the SLM used consolidating strategies to shape the service and secure smooth implementation, in this second moment, the bureaucrat had to put objective and quantitative indicators to convince

State authorities on the importance and impact of the issue. Such a result is foreseen by Kingdon (2003), the author maintains that indicators are one of the elements that raise awareness to the problem, getting attention from decision-makers.

5.1.3 Attributes related to success

Literature has long debated entrepreneurship, sometimes labeling it a behavior other times a trait (KIRZNER, 1973; KNIGHT, 1921; SCHUMPETER, 1934; WEBER, 1930; MCCLELLAND, 1961). However, policy entrepreneurship literature usually takes both approaches as entrepreneurial activity is typically analyzed in terms of strategies and attributes (ZAHARIADIS, 2008). In this work, street-level policy entrepreneurship is assessed in terms of strategy, however as Frisch-Aviram 2019 reports, a vast literature has identified attributes as part of determinants for success. Through the interviews it was possible to identify three main attribute that might have contributed to I3's success: Attention to team building; trust building; social and political acuity.

As this work maintains that for the first part of the case I3 acted like policy champion, it is important to express that the attributes identified through the categories in Table 4 strongly relate to the ones identified by Howell, She and Higgins (2005) concerning champions. The authors reveal that champions must get the right people involved in their endeavor; such behavior is strongly linked to **attention to team building**. The authors also express that champions must promote the innovation enthusiastically, demonstrate trust over the positive outcomes of the innovation, be optimistic and point out, effectively, the reasons why the innovation will be successful. The previous actions can attest to the champion knowledge on the innovation, an important aspect for **trust-building.** Howell, She and Higgins (2005) also point out that champions must hand problems to those who can fix them, while meaning to get decision-makers involved. In order to identify and convince these people, it is certain that a lot of **social and political acuity is involved**.

In this light, the traits identified in I3's case are presented next:

A) Attention to team building

The strength of policy entrepreneurs does not come from their ideas only. Their ability to work effectively with other professionals is deeply related to their power of pushing change and securing desired outcomes (MINTROM; LUETJENS, 2019). An effective alliance building

provides the entrepreneur with a framework to project power, control information flow, and attempt to influence changes and promote innovation within their context (HE, 2018).

As the head of the CVV's implementation in Manhuaçu, Interviewee 3 showcased a significant concern for those who were to work alongside her. Her initial worry was not to suffer any political interference in the selection process. The former manager claimed that the selection process was based on the profile she outlined for the professionals who were to be taken on. "I set a profile for each professional. It included responsibility, competence, the technical part, availability and the will they had to work in teams, done that, I went looking for that profile" (I3). I3 reported that the first part of the selection was a technical test that encompassed the services there were to be offered by the Center. Interviews were conducted later on with the professionals who ranked the highest, in which she presented her work plan, what she expected from them, and posed a final question "Are you on board?" (I3). The bureaucrat claimed that interviews on the early stages of the selection process were an enabler for political interference and argued that doing things the way she did freed the process of political interference.

The former manager`s endeavor to build a team free of political interference contrasts with how the same process went down in Viçosa. When asked about her participation in team building, I10 reported having taken no participation when it came to selecting professionals to work in the Center. The former head of CVV Viçosa stated that the Municipality's mayor chose all professionals at the time; in her own words: "the choice was essentially political" (I10). In this vein, I7, who worked as a nurse in the initial years of CVV Viçosa, indicated that indeed there was no selection process and all staff was hired through political indication, including her.

Reflecting on the issue, the CVV Viçosa's former nurse highlighted that some professionals were not prepared to provide the services the Center needed to provide in some situations. "For example, they could not perform ultrasounds, they did not do those kind of exams, do you understand? So that was the problem. It was the more complex exams, at the time, that were really difficult to put in place" (I7).

Interviewee 8 expressed that although the manager position is always a political choice, the choice can be made based on technical parameters. However, according to the nutritionist, that has not always been the case; she stated that there had been some cases of "really bad" political choices (I10). For example, the bureaucrat reported the case of a manager who caused a split on the team, hindering service provision, and was later removed from the job through a petition signed by the majority of the professionals (I10).

The path seems to have been smoother in Manhuançu. The lack of technical skills during the Center`s implementation did not show up in any interview. I4 reported that when I3 conducted the interviews, she was already aware of each professional's technical abilities. Manhuaçu's former manager's attention to team building seems to have paid off, as showcased in the next section. The bureaucrat was able to unite the staff and gather essential support for her endeavors.

B) Trust building

The second trait identified through the assessment of the interviews was trust-building. Interviewee 3 was found to have developed trust in professional relationships, gathering a support network for her efforts to shape the service and the policy. According to Schneider, Teske And Mintrom (2011), establishing trust in relationships within the professional field and support networks is crucial for policy entrepreneurs to chase their goals.

With that in mind, it was possible to identify in some of the carried out interviews passages that attest to the trust-based relationships I3 maintained with the actors around her, counting with their help to shape the service and promote change in the policy. The most emblematic one is from I5, who stated that "The Center developed alongside her, we say that we are **her children**, a team that dreamed by her side, and we were ready to fight for everything." Compared to a motherly figure, it did not strike as a surprise that along the interviews, it was possible to notice that I3 harvested great support when it came to both of her endeavors to shape policy

As previously exposed, through the strategy of vision diffusion, I3 secured that her vision materialized in a work-plan, was officially conveyed to Center`s brand new staff. The strategy was put in place through workshops organized and conducted by I4. In this sense, due to I4`s professional nature, she became a valuable asset to I3 when it came to managing the center`s social capital., "(…) I was the only psychologist, she chose me to carry out the workshops" (I4).

In this sense, as previously mentioned in the team leadership section, I3 smartly led the professionals by sometimes knowing herself what had to be done but endowing them with the choice on how to do it. Such leadership style established a two-way street when it came to trust, she trusted professionals with projects, professionals trusted her because they believed she knew what was best.

Concerning the negotiation carried out with the state to reintroduce the assistance to sexual violence and abuse victims in the service portfolio, it came up as a collective endeavor on the interviews. Although negotiations and communication were established and led by I3, the interviews carried out with I2, I4 and I5 revealed that they were all on board and backing her. Such support is highlighted in the following passages, "**we** negotiated with the state (…) one year later the service was reintroduced in the service portfolio" (I2), "(…) the service was no longer covered by the State (…) even so, **we** continued providing it, **we** were very committed to it" (I4), " (…) when the service was excluded from the portfolio because the other centers were not providing it, **we** fought for it" (I5).

In this sense, either impressing her vision on the Center`s services or negotiating to bring back an essential service to the service portfolio, I3 had by her side professionals who trusted her and helped her carry on with her goals. Although subject to I3 due to her managing position, some passages suggest that support from the professionals did not only came from a professional sense of duty. For example, I5 stated that in her vision, the former manager was a person of great knowledge and credited it to her years as coordinator of the primary health, "she knew a lot about public health" (I5).

Works like He (2018) and Tang et al. (2020) highlight the importance of knowledge previously acquired in other areas or sectors for the success of the entrepreneurs' endeavors. He (2018) argues that many cases of failed entrepreneurs can be linked to the lack of professional knowledge, which directly hinders their analytical capacity. Here, I3's previous professional knowledge not only was crucial for her to come up with a vision and posteriorly a plan for the service, but it also seemed to have made her colleagues feel comfortable under her management, bringing them to her side and providing her with important allies.

C) Social and political Acuity

Mintrom and Norman (2009) argue that a policy entrepreneur must be well-versed in the social-political context in which they are operating; furthermore, understanding others and engaging in conversations concerning policy is also a crucial element highlighted by the authors. Such skills enable the policy entrepreneur to scan and interpret their operating environment aiming to push policy change (MINTROM; LUETJENS, 2017). Such features are indeed very much aligned with Kirzner (1997,1937) portrayal of entrepreneurs, agents who are alert to opportunities they learn to spot through their everyday experience.

Thus, knowing how to engage in important conversations and convey crucial information helps one strengthen professional social connections and transit among different spheres. Furthermore, the trust I3 built within her professional circle was crucial in backup; she obviously could not do everything independently; it would not be possible if she were not well-versed socially. However, such an asset might not be enough, the higher instances must listen and respond. What to say? How to say it? To whom? When? With that in mind, it was possible to identify in some of the carried out interviews passages that attest to the good relationships I3 maintained with multilevel actors, counting with their help to shape the service and promote change in the policy.

Chronologically, the first suggestion of a good political relationship comes up materialized in the carte blanche the bureaucrat received from the local authority. The "white canvas" the bureaucrat received to "paint on" compared to I10's reality in Viçosa can only be understood as a privilege. This strong connection to the local authority can be in part explained by I3 former position as coordinator of primary health. As He (2018) explains, a favorable position can help gather political capital. In this sense, I3 claimed that she built credibility with the local administration as coordinator of primary health.

A little further ahead, while managing the Center's first steps, the former manager claimed having established yet another critical bond with the State Health Secretariat. "I kept a full-time link with the State concerning my process of construction of implementation" (I3). This process can be understood, actually, as a unilateral conversation. Once the State's lack of guidance during implementation is already known and previously exposed, the link the former manager established can be understood, among other things, as a precaution not to step on anybody's toes. She wanted them to know what she was doing, even though they were not effectively guiding her.

It was also an opportunity to enter a new space. Previously in primary health, the bureaucrat was subject only to the Municipality and managing the CVV Manhuaçu, she was subordinate to higher instances. "During the implementation process, I got really close to the Health Secretariat, to the point of talking to them after working hours, explaining ideas of how the construction of this dream would take place"(I3).

The good relationship with the State and the municipality seem to have continued over the years I3 managed the Center. I5 reported that throughout I3`s management, the Center was in constant touch with the State, the Regional Health Secretariat, and the Municipality. "There was a really rich exchange in all senses" (I5). The nutritionist reported that in one specific

situation, the former manager's good relationship with the health secretary of the municipality helped them guarantee the provision of infant formula, an arrangement that, according to her, still remains.

Interviewee 3 also reported that the negotiations carried out with the State concerning the victims of sexual violence and abuse was also a moment she seized to tighten bonds.

> I wanted to inform you that during this period we only strengthened relations with the state. Relationship of trust, credibility and, and we carried out some presentations of the CVV Manhuaçu for the other municipalities. We were inside the Federal University of Juiz de Fora presenting The Viva Vida center to all other centers in the State final. We had some moments where we had the opportunity to demonstrate service and had meetings with the secretary of state in Belo Horizonte.

Building teams, transmitting professional vision to others, building trust, and establishing ties within higher instances of power, as Mintrom and Luetjens (2019) point out, such actions demand high social and political acuity levels. I3 found supporters and venues for effective advocacy of her professional visions, using her networks, drawing support from local and state agents, and serving the right policy arguments when necessary.

5.1.4 Lessons from the case

To take stock on the lessons that can be drawn from I3's case, it is important to look at this work's research question: **How do street-level bureaucrats in the Viva Vida Center's context use entrepreneurial strategies to shape policy via implementation practices and/or change policy design?** The overall lesson that was expected to be drawn from this work was to shed light on the context, strategies, and attributes concerning SLB's who engaged in an entrepreneurial endeavor to shape policy. Nevertheless, a more attentive look at the research question reveals that lessons can be drawn further from the three abovementioned elements. Policy entrepreneurship, street-level bureaucracy, implementation, and agenda-setting are the literatures hinted in the research question, which effectively guided the analysis carried out in this dissertation. All of these elements are connected by the policy process.

The case related here is of participant I3. I3 was the manager of CVV Manhuaçu from 2010 to 2017, as shown in the previous sections, a key actor in its history. She successfully outlined the Center's prototype and closely followed and acted on every implementation aspect to secure her vision for CVV Manhuaçu. Years later, when things were changed around by a top-down decision, she ultimately acted to reinsert the issue of sexual violence and abuse

victims into the official government agenda. In this light, from the policy process perspective, the case is chronologically divided into two distinct moments, illustrated in Figure 7.

Figure 7 – The two moments of I3's case.



Source: Prepared by the authors

It is argued here that, when the SLM prototyped the CVV Manhuaçu and closely followed its implementation, she assumed the role of a champion (Roberts 1992), whereas in the second moment, when she took on the role of a policy entrepreneur, acting to promote change in policy by advocating for the reinsertion of an issue into the Minas Gerais state government agenda, she assumed the role of a policy entrepreneur (Kingdom 2003). In light of such arguments, this work showcases that SLBs, a SLM here, **can promote policy change in different policy process levels, depending on the organizational and political conditions**.

The first moment

The first moment of the case (Figure 6) happened within the implementation stage of the policy process. The bureaucrat saw herself in a situation of almost nonexistent guidelines for implementation, but at the same time, enjoying a high level of discretion. Thus, as discussed earlier, the bureaucrat was in a favorable situation that enabled her to develop an administrative

prototype for CVV Manhuaçu. By doing so, the bureaucrat set the organizational structure, strategies, and goals for the Center, therefore, defining the settings of the policy instrument, the Viva Vida Center. This kind of change is defined as first order or first level change and is considered an incremental type of change (HALL, 1990). Thus, by prototyping the CVV Manhuaçu, the SLM promoted policy change at a micro-level.

It is true though that the bottom-up scholars have been long exposing this "translation" function carried out by street-level bureaucrats during implementation, Gassner and Gofen (2018) have done so, Lipsky (2010) has done so. However, it is the unique position of I3 that allows us to argue that what she has done was not merely a function already expected from a street-level bureaucrat, but in fact, championing the CVV.

The street-level manager was placed at the intersection of formal policymaking, target population, and highly contextual work (LYPSKY, 1980). The manager seized such a scenario as an opportunity to impress her professional vision on the Center. Without concrete top-down orientations, and being the first manager ever, translation became an original work, a prototype; there was virtually nothing to be translated and a big "white canvas" to be filled Aware of the team she was building while maintaining important relations with State and Municipality, I3 heavily shaped the work process within the CVV Manhuaçu, impressing her long-lasting mark within the service through a very well-constructed administrative prototype.

Thus, such a unique position entails a combination of factors: being the first manager ever, a "white canvas" to work on, having discretion/ the innovative quality of the CVV. Thus, based on Roberts (1992) perspective on champions and the results in this work, another lesson is that, **given the right conditions, street-level managers might champion innovative initiatives.**

Insights can also be drawn from the strategies I3 used to shape the policy during implementation. The assessment of I3`s interview revealed that she carried out a problem framing of her own, and there was no suggestion though that major indicators, feedback from government actions or focusing events (KINGDOM, 2003) played a big role in it, indicating that, in the case of I3, her problem framing was highly supported by previous knowledge acquired by on the ground, work experience. By having deep knowledge of the issue the CVVs aimed to mitigate, the SLM was able to design a prototype based on all the feedback from her previous years working as coordinator of the primary health level. Thus, the results have indicated that the **accurate contextual problem framing contributed to a more refined and**

effective administrative prototype, translated into a CVV capable of attending the demands it was supposed to.

Like in Frisch-Aviram (2019), the use of linked entrepreneurial strategies was also identified in I3's case. As we have identified, the vision diffusion strategy was linked to the strategy before it, process planning/prototyping. **Such findings reveal that linked entrepreneurial strategies can be present in SLB's endeavors to influence policy at the implementation level**. It adds to SLPE literature by contributing to future investigations, reinforcing that while strategies are usually displayed separately within academic works, they might be identified as linked to one another during empirical investigations

As for the strategies in an overall perspective, problem framing, process planning/prototyping, vision diffusion, and team leadership, seem to have been employed for smooth implementation's sake. As we understand that one of the champion's roles is to secure an unruffled path for the implementation of the innovation, the strategies the SLM employed within the context of CVV Manhuaçu implementation seemed to have served such role. Thus, **the case presented here suggests that the strategies employed in the first moment were deliberately of consolidating nature.** Although the power of generalization here is limited as we deal with a single case study, such insight might be an indicator that the stage of the policy process influences the choice of strategies for policy change.

The insights provided so far, echoes Baumgartner and Jones (2005) ideas, strengthening the logic that ideas are born at any level, as actors within the policy process develop over time their own perception of a social problem's nature, analyzing the fitting solutions and choosing among available options. However, in the case of I3, she managed to shape the settings of the policy instrument she worked in because the conditions were right. Frisch-Aviram, Cohen, and Beeri (2018) show that a shift from a hierarchical to a more governance-oriented administrative system enables entrepreneurship at the street level. In I3's case, **a shift from a governance-oriented administrative system to a more hierarchical hindered entrepreneurial actions**. According to the interviews, the administrative system within CVV Manhuaçu became stricter and less participative after the political turnovers that resulted in I3's removal from office, making it less receptive to entrepreneurial endeavors. Indeed, no entrepreneurial activity or adaptation functions carried out by the SLBs working in the CVV Manhuaçu were identified posteriorly to the change in management.

The second moment

Due to a political turnover at the state level, the public policy that brought the CVVs to the world was redesigned. While the turnover caused the policy-making decision power to shift hands, in the interviews, it was not mentioned that the knowledge base on women and children's health underwent any significant change. Therefore, as we draw from Hall (1990) and Howlett and Ramesh (1998), a political turnover without a change in episteme might explain why the Viva Vida Centers, the instruments of the policy, were reformulated so quickly. In this light, the change from CVVs to CEAES implied in an incremental and swift second order/level policy change.

More specifically, the CEAE's represent the fusion of CVVs and the Hiperdia centers. Therefore, such change represents a change in the policy mix, as two policy instruments were matched into a single one. In this process, it seems like the assistance to women and children victimized by sexual violence and abuse, an instrument setting of the CVV, was lost. Under the multiple streams perspective, it represents the exclusion of the sexual violence and abuse against women and children issue from the official government agenda.

In light of such contextualization, in the second moment of the case approached here, participant I3 assumed the role of a policy entrepreneur. The bureaucrat was set on a path of taking the importance of assisting women and children victimized by sexual violence and abuse to the higher instances. As showcased in the previous sections, the bureaucrat was successful, and the service returned to the Center's portfolio.

Mintrom (1997) and Mintrom and Norman (2009) argue that when entrepreneurs advocate for policy change aiming to improve social outcomes, the higher instances may look out of touch, making legislators focus on the consequences of their inactions rather than their actions. Therefore, I3 used a "by the book" strategy to sensitize the higher instances, evidence-based argumentation. The bureaucrat revealed having brought to State's attention the numbers on the cases of sexual violence and abuse and the number of assisted individuals on the matter, arguing that a considerable portion of the clientele would be left unassisted and with no other health facility to assist them.

If the strategy used by I3 was the expected one, what went in parallel to negotiation gets the eye. While taking on the role of a policy entrepreneur, the nature of I3's position allowed her to adapt service delivery so women and children victimized by sexual violence and abuse would not go unassisted.

Gassner and Gofen (2018) define adaptations as reshaping direct delivery arrangements, addressing gaps identified on the ground. Although the gap I3 aimed to mitigate was left by an intentional shift in policy design, she acted on it, ensuring assistance to sexual violence and abuse victims would go on, even though the service was no longer in the service portfolio. In this sense, the adaptation meant the continuance of a service that was supposed to be ceased, a decision made based on the importance of the service as an answer to a demand that so far had been successfully addressed. Thus, doing "nothing" in the face of a State ordinance was how the former SLM provided a on-the-ground solution when the needs of part of the policy clientele were "unmet by current arrangements" (GASSNER; GOFEN, 2018, p.561).

This work takes the actions of I3 as an adaption because service delivery differed from the new institutional policy guidelines and aimed to fill a gap in assistance, even if it meant just the continuity of what was already being done. Moreover, consequently, as her endeavor of reinserting the issue into the agenda was completed and successful, the service delivery is not to be considered an adaptation anymore. Thus, the case of I3 also hints that **the unique position SLMs hold at the intersection of formal policymaking, target population, and highly contextual work enables them to act as policy entrepreneurs within the agenda-setting phase while concomitantly adapting the policy at the implementation level to fill the spotted gap.** We understand that by doing so, SLMs hold the potential to institutionalize the adaptations they carry out, moving out of the informal zone, and ultimately affecting the institutional level.

In light of the lessons presented here, the next section presents the work's final considerations.

6 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This research was guided by the following question: How do street-level bureaucrats in the Viva Vida Center's context use entrepreneurial strategies to shape policy via implementation practices and/or change policy design? In this light, this work aimed to investigate engagement of street-level bureaucrats working within the Viva Vida Centers from the South East Macro-Region of Minas Gerais – formed by the Ponte Nova, Viçosa and Manhuaçu micro-regions – in entrepreneurial actions by the use of entrepreneurial strategies to shape policy through implementation practices and/or influence policy design directly. In specific terms, it was sought to identify what might prompt street-level bureaucrats to act as policy entrepreneurs, identify what strategies they can adopted to shape policy and what personal attributes possibly contribute to their success.

The literature on policy entrepreneurship has long ignored the potential of street-level bureaucrats to shape policies through entrepreneurial actions. Indeed, such actors are often under considerable pressure while facing scarcity of resources and contradictory political mandates. Nevertheless, on the other hand, as implementers of the policies designed in the higher levels of bureaucracy, they are the ones who experience at first hand the discrepancies between the policy design and real-life service delivery. Therefore, due to their closeness to the field, they might be the ones who know better how policies can be improved, as they conduct translations and adaptations in their daily routine so clients are not left unattended. In the face of such inherent characteristics, as Arnold (2015) argues, there is no reason to continue ignoring these service providers, as they clearly have the potential to cause policy change.

Thus, to attain what was proposed, the main goal was broken down into three specific ones: Identify under what organizational and political conditions street-level bureaucrats will act as policy entrepreneurs; identify what strategies street-level bureaucrats adopt to shape policy; identify the factors that explain the success of street-level policy entrepreneurs. Through the semi-structured interviews carried out with the bureaucrats from both CVVs mentioned above, and the categories drawn from literature, this work assessed all the established goals.

The Viva Vida Centers, reformulated into CEAEs in 2015, were tools of a state public policy in Minas Gerais that aimed to mitigate maternal and child death . The Centers were supposed to provide quality secondary care to the groups mentioned above. As the interviews unfold, the case of I3 was identified. The former manager of CVV Manhuaçu acted in two different moments to shape policy, first as champion at the implementation level and posteriorly

as a policy entrepreneur at the agenda-setting stage. The interview conducted with I3, and the ones conducted with her peers, enabled the identification of the elements that prompted her, the strategies she used, and the attributes that helped her to be successful in these two different moments.

Concerning the first moment of the case, literature-wise, as we looked at championship through Roberts (1992) perspective, we assumed that what differentiates a champion from policy entrepreneurs are not their actions but the phase of the policy process they act in. In this light, this work approximated both literatures as we drew from categories based on policy entrepreneurship literature to investigate championship. As we understand that the categories were successful in helping to unveil I3 endeavor in the case's first moment, we add to Public Administration literature by providing a feasible way to assess the contextual, strategical and profiling elements of champions endeavors. Thus, this research has shown empirically that the similarities between champions and policy entrepreneurs can go beyond theoretical aspects.

Still, on the case's first moment, it was unveiled some elements that placed the former manager in a unique position, allowing her to assume the champion role. Although this work's goal was not to analyze the policy behind the Viva Vida Centers, it is relevant to stress that one of these elements was the lack of guidelines for implementing the CVVs. The results have shown that in the face of such a problem, the street-level manager (I3), while endowed with important attributes for entrepreneurship, employed strategies to consolidate the center, heavily based on her personal and professional view, overcoming the lack of state's presence during implementation. However, what if there was no I3 to "save the day"? i.e., how would implementation have gone if the Center's manager was unwilling to step in effectively? In the interviews with participants from CVV Viçosa there was no sign of a champion, and passages that attested to much political interference during implementation. The overall perspective from participants was how diffuse instructions were, how some professionals were not suitable for the job, and how they did not have the governability to do much, "every day you put out a fire" (I7). Thus, as we understand that one of the conditions for I3's endeavor was the State's omission concerning implementation guidelines, it is important to showcase that such omission might as well have jeopardized the implementation of Centers elsewhere.

As we look to the second moment, in which I3 assumed the role of a policy entrepreneur, we have shown that using a "by the book" strategy, she was successful in putting the issue of sexual violence and abuse into the governmental agenda again, reintegrating assistance to this group to the service portfolio. What is very interesting in this situation is the chain of events

that prompted her. Kickstarted by a political turnover and culminated in the reformulation of the policy's instruments, such events highlighted the effect of the political stream on the bureaucrat's context and how it propelled her into action. On the other hand, the shift on the local policy stream hindered I3 efforts to keep running the center with the same level of discretion she once had, resulting in her removal from office e putting in place a more hierarchical administrative system within the Center. Thus, this work adds to the literature by showing how shifts in the political stream might end up propelling or hampering entrepreneurial actives within street-level bureaucracy. Thus, a possible venue for future studies would be assessing the stream involved at the implementation level, as Kingdom (2003) did concerning the agenda-setting. It should contribute to better understating entrepreneurs acting at the implementation level and implementation per se.

Gaps in assistance often appear in literature as a prompting element for street-level entrepreneurship (GASSNER; GOFEN, 2018; PETCHEY; WILLIAMS; CARTER, 2008; ZHANG; ZHAO; DONG, 2021). Thus, in its essence, what both moments of I3's case have shown us is that bureaucrats can do more than just stand by and conduct standard procedures; they can actually make a difference, making policies more responsive and contextualized to the needs of specific clientele, like argued by Arnold (2015). Here, it has been shown that it can happen at least in two different phases of the policy process. Therefore, we follow Frisch-Aviram, Cohen, and Beeri (2018) and stress the importance of promoting proactivity among the street-level bureaucracy, and place at their reach, political and governance instruments for political participation, once just favorable personal traits might not enough sometimes. As seen in this research, the use of entrepreneurial strategies can increase the chances of success for street-level bureaucrats in influencing policy outcomes. Thus it is also essential to advance concerning the comprehension of the factors that might impede them in doing so.

Overall, this research has deepened empirical knowledge on the street level's contextual elements, strategies, and attributes related to policy entrepreneurship. It has also uncovered new ones regarding what prompted I3 and the strategies she used, contextualizing them within the policy process. By doing so, this works adds to the literature by not only showcasing solid categories for analyzing context, strategies, and personal attributes for investigations on street-level policy entrepreneurship, but while also adding to them.

It is important to stress that for dealing with a single case and a low number of participants, the ability to generalize the insights and results exposed here are limited; however, they might be helpful in the preliminary stages of investigations on other street-level managers

engaged in entrepreneurial actions to shape services and/or change policy design, as its lessons provided some hypothesis that can be systematically tested with larger numbers of cases. Therefore, future studies capable of applying the categories established in this work to broder contexts, encompassing a gigher numbers of participants are welcome. By doing so, it will enhace the power of generalization, providing more consolidated operational tools for the assessment of street-level policy entrepreneurship in the national context.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A – Questionnaire

Questionário

Perfil do Respondente

( ) Centro Viva Vida (CVV) - Microrregião de Viçosa

( ) Centro Viva Vida (CVV) – Microrregião de Manhuaçu

a) Nome:

b) Grau de escolaridade:

c) Data de nascimento:

d) Há quanto tempo integra o serviço público:

e) Cargo no Centro Viva Vida e suas respectivas atribuições:

1. Compõe a nível municipal/ regional/estadual o Comitê de Prevenção de Mortalidade Materna, Infantil e Fetal (CPMMIF)?

( ) Sim ( ) Não

2. Você teve algum papel na implantação do Centro Viva Vida na sua microrregião?

( ) Sim ( ) Não

Qual?_____

3. Você conhece alguém que tenha desempenhado um papel importante na implementação do CVV em sua microrregião?

( ) Sim ( ) Não

Quem? Poderia deixar uma forma de contato? (Preferencialmente e-mail)

_____

Ações

1. Eu percebo ou já percebi um problema que se relaciona à política pública de combate à mortalidade infantil na minha microrregião.

( ) Sim ( ) Não

2. Eu estou procurando ou já procurei uma solução para o problema que percebi.

   ( ) Sim ( ) Não

3. Eu lidero um já liderei uma rede com outros atores a fim de promover mudanças na política pública para que ela possa mitigar o problema que percebi.

   ( ) Sim ( ) Não

4. Estou assumindo ou já assumi riscos profissionais e/ou financeiros a fim de promover mudanças na política pública.

   ( ) Sim ( ) Não

5. Eu estou persuadindo ou já persuadi agentes políticos a aceitarem minha proposta de mudança na política pública

   ( ) Sim ( ) Não

6. Você conhece alguém que tenha agido a fim de influenciar o desenho da política pública de combate à mortalidade infantil em sua microrregião

   ( ) Sim ( ) Não

   Quem? Poderia deixar uma forma de contato? (Preferencialmente e-mail)

   _____

Características da comunidade e da rede de política

Em uma escala de 1 a 5, marque o grau em que as afirmações a seguir se aplicam. .

1. Minha comunidade profissional é grande em tamanho

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

2. Minha comunidade profissional é consensual e conservadora

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

3. Minha comunidade profissional possui capacidade de gerar mudanças no desenho da política pública e minha microrregião

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

4. Minha comunidade profissional é hierárquica

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

5. A rede de política pública (Rede Viva Vida) em que trabalho é grande em tamanho

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

6. A rede de política em que trabalho (Rede Viva Vida) é consensual e conservadora

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

7. A rede de política pública em que trabalho (Rede Viva Vida) tem capacidade de gerar mudanças no desenho da política em minha microrregião

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

8. A rede de política pública em que trabalho (Rede Viva Vida) é hierarquizada

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

Habilidades/Aptidões e Acesso

Em uma escala de 1 a 5, marque o grau em que as afirmações a seguir se aplicam. .

1. Tenho acesso a importantes atores políticos

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

2. Sinto confiança na minha capacidade de liderar pelo exemplo

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

3. Sinto confiança na minha capacidade de formar equipes de profissionais

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

Intenções

1. Em uma escala de 1 a 5, marque o grau em que a afirmação a seguir se aplica: Eu quero ou já quis promover mudanças no desenho da política pública de combate à mortalidade infantil em minha microrregião

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

2. O quão provável é que eu assuma riscos profissionais e/ou financeiros a fim de promover mudanças no desenho da política pública?

( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

3.Em sua visão, quais são os principais empecilhos para que você busque mudanças no desenho da política pública de combate à mortalidade infantil em sua microrregião?

_____

Appendix B – Interview Script

Roteiro de entrevista

Perfil do entrevistado

f) Nome:

g) Data de nascimento:

h) Há quanto tempo integra o serviço público?

i) Qual o grau de escolaridade?

Relação do entrevistado com o CVV

1. Primeiramente, o que você entende por políticas públicas de combate à mortalidade infantil? Você as considera importantes? Por qual razão?

2. Gostaria de saber um pouco mais sobre seu trabalho no Centro Viva Vida. Você poderia me contar sobre seu cargo, tempo que o exerce e suas atribuições?

3. Você poderia compartilhar seu entendimento a respeito da Rede Viva Vida e do papel dos Centro Viva Vida dentro desta rede?

4. Qual a sua percepção a respeito do trabalho que exerce dentro do contexto desta Rede e do Centro Viva Vida?

5. Você teve algum papel na implantação do Centro Viva Vida na sua microrregião? Se sim, qual? Poderia me contar um pouco mais como se deu esta implantação e seus desdobramentos?

Condições políticas e organizacionais

6. Você já percebeu algum problema que se relaciona à política pública de combate à mortalidade infantil com a qual você trabalha? Se sim, qual?

7. De que forma este problema veio à sua atenção? Algum acontecimento, indicador social ou *feedback* de alguma ação governamental contribui para isso?

8. Em relação a este (s) problema (s), você possui ou possuía alguma proposta de para mitiga-lo? Qual/Quais?

9. Você poderia discorrer a respeito da viabilidade técnica e econômica da sua proposta?

10. Você poderia me contar a respeito do cenário nacional/local, das forças políticas e da situação governamental que permearam este processo?

11. Quais foram as motivações internas e externas que te levaram a agir?

Ações adotadas

12. Com a intenção de angariar forças para sua proposta você em algum momento buscou apoio em outros colegas de trabalho, organizações e/ ou representantes da sociedade civil? Como se deu este processo?

13. No sentido de fortalecer a sua visão acerca da situação problema e promover sua proposta, você compartilhou com seus colegas seu conhecimento a respeito dos aspectos sociais e políticos da questão abordada por você? Se sim, como o fez?

14. Ainda neste sentido, você adotou alguma ação a fim de promover sua proposta em maior escala e demonstrar sua viabilidade? Quais ações foram estas?

15. Especificamente, quais ações você adotou a fim de convencer atores políticos relevantes a aderirem à sua proposta?

16. Neste processo você contou com a ajuda de colegas mais experientes que já tenham promovido ações similares?

Referências

1. Você conhece alguém que tenha desempenhado um papel importante na implementação do CVV em sua microrregião? Quem? Poderia deixar uma forma de contato? (Preferencialmente e-mail).
2. Você conhece alguém que tenha agido a fim de influenciar o desenho da política pública de combate à mortalidade infantil em sua microrregião? Quem? Poderia deixar uma forma de contato? (Preferencialmente e-mai

Appendix C- Term of consentiment

CONSENTIMENTO LIVRE E ESCLARECIDO

O Sr.(a) está sendo convidado(a) como voluntário(a) a participar da pesquisa EMPREENDEDORISMO DE NÍVEL DE RUA: UM ESTUDO NOS CENTROS ESTADUAIS DE ATENÇÃO ESPECIALIZADA (CEAE) DA MACRO-REGIÃO LESTE DO SUL – MG. Assim, o principal objetivo deste trabalho é analisar se os burocratas de nível de rua que trabalham no CEAE utilizam ações empreendedoras para influenciar diretamente o desenho de políticas públicas. Especificamente, pretende-se identificar sob quais condições organizacionais e políticas os burocratas de nível de rua agirão como empreendedores de políticas, identificar quais ações os burocratas nível de rua adotam para serem ativos no desenho de políticas e identificar os fatores que explicam o sucesso ou o fracasso dos burocratas de nível de rua empreendedores de políticas.

Para esta pesquisa adotaremos os seguintes procedimentos: pesquisa qualitativa através da análise documental, análise bibliográfica, questionário e entrevista com gravação de áudio. Utilizaremos a análise de conteúdo para analisar e interpretar os resultados provenientes dos documentos, da bibliografia, do questionário e das entrevistas
Os links para os questionários serão enviados via e-mail. As entrevistas serão realizadas virtualmente, totalizando o tempo previsto de 90 minutos por entrevista. A decisão de enviar os questionários via e-mail e de realizar as entrevistas virtualmente se deu mediante ao cenário vivenciado atualmente em decorrência da pandemia da Covid-19, buscando assim, a proteção dos participantes da pesquisa.

Desta forma, este termo de consentimento está sendo enviado por e-mail para o Sr. (a), e após a realização de sua leitura e seu consentimento de participação na pesquisa mediante assinatura deste documento, o mesmo deverá ser retornado para o pesquisador responsável via e-mail (remetente).

Sabendo que a utilização de técnicas como questionário e entrevistas com gravação de áudio podem expor dados pessoais dos participantes da pesquisa ou falta de compreensão do que é perguntado ou mesmo inibi-los a responder de maneira fiel a realidade, caso alguma dessas situações ocorra, por gentileza, fique à vontade em interromper a sua participação, em qualquer fase da pesquisa, sem qualquer penalidade.

Os dados coletados serão tratados com confidencialidade, sendo analisados pelos pesquisadores envolvidos no estudo, podendo ser utilizados em outras pesquisas mantendo a mesma confidencialidade quanto às informações neles constantes. Cada participante da pesquisa será tratado por códigos e somente os pesquisadores saberão identificar, de modo a assegurar a privacidade do participante da pesquisa.

Os riscos envolvidos na pesquisa consistem em exposição acidental dos dados pessoais dos participantes ou de pacientes atendidos pelos participantes; má compreensão das perguntas; inibição do participante. Para mitiga-los será feito: explicação da pesquisa e seus objetivos; explicitar o motivo da escolha do participante; ressaltar que o anonimato e o sigilo serão mantidos; dar liberdade ao participante para se expressar no decorrer da entrevista.

Os benefícios da pesquisa aparecem no âmbito acadêmico, prático e social, por buscar fornecer um quadro teórico, apontando as condições que incentivam o empreendedorismo entre esses burocratas de nível de rua, possivelmente preenchendo lacunas na literatura administrativa sobre o potencial de ações de micro nível dos trabalhadores de linha de frente para influenciar mudanças políticas de nível macro. Também por objetivar para a literatura de empreendedorismo político, ampliando o conhecimento de condições que motivam o comportamento empreendedor, as ações que o
acompanham e possíveis razões para o sucesso e o fracasso. De forma prática os resultados dessa pesquisa poderão auxiliar os burocratas que atuam no CVV à atuarem enquanto empreendedores de políticas públicas, fornecendo informações sobre como fazê-lo, os principais entraves, ações importantes, elementos que corroboram com o sucesso e/ou falha da ação empreendedora no âmbito das políticas públicas. Entende-se assim que os burocratas de nível de rua poderão lançar mão dos resultados desta pesquisa a fim de facilitar e compreender seu caminho âmbito do "policy entrepreneurship" de nível de rua. Além disso, ao fornecer para burocratas do CEAE ferramentas que facilitem a promoção de novas políticas, a sociedade ganha ao ter acesso à políticas públicas desenhadas e/ou influenciadas por agentes que estão em contato direto com o público.

Para participar deste estudo o Sr.(a) não terá nenhum custo, nem receberá qualquer vantagem financeira. Apesar disso, diante de eventuais danos, identificados e comprovados, decorrentes da pesquisa, o Sr.(a) tem assegurado o direito à indenização, conforme dispõe a resolução 446/2012. O Sr.(a) tem garantida plena liberdade de recusar-se a participar ou retirar seu consentimento, em qualquer fase da pesquisa, sem necessidade de comunicado prévio. A sua participação é voluntária e a recusa em participar não acarretará qualquer penalidade ou modificação na forma em que o Sr.(a) é atendido(a) pelo pesquisador. Os resultados da pesquisa estarão à sua disposição quando finalizada. O(A) Sr.(a) não será identificado(a) em nenhuma publicação que possa resultar. Seu nome ou o material que indique sua participação não serão liberados sem a sua permissão.

Este termo de consentimento encontra-se impresso em duas vias originais, sendo que uma será arquivada pelo pesquisador responsável, em sua sala no Departamento de Administração e Contabilidade da UFV sob os cuidados do mesmo, e a outra será fornecida ao Sr.(a).

Os dados e instrumentos utilizados na pesquisa ficarão arquivados com o pesquisador responsável por um período de 5 (cinco) anos após o término da pesquisa. Depois desse tempo, os mesmos serão destruídos. Os pesquisadores tratarão a sua identidade com padrões profissionais de sigilo e confidencialidade, atendendo à legislação brasileira, em especial, à Resolução 466/2012 do Conselho Nacional de Saúde, e utilizarão as informações somente para fins acadêmicos e científicos.

Eu,_____, contato_____ ,fui informado(a) dos objetivos da pesquisa EMPREENDEDORISMO DE NÍVEL DE RUA:
UM ESTUDO NOS CENTROS VIVA VIDA DA MACRO-REGIÃO
LESTE DO SUL –MG de maneira clara e detalhada, e esclareci minhas dúvidas. Sei que a qualquer momento poderei solicitar novas informações e modificar minha decisão de participar se assim o desejar. Declaro que concordo em participar, inclusive autorizo expressamente a gravação de áudio. Recebi uma via original deste termo de consentimento livre e esclarecido e me foi dada a oportunidade de ler e esclarecer minhas dúvidas.

Se desejar outras informações sobre o projeto, entre em contato com o pesquisador responsável abaixo nominado.

Nome do Pesquisador Responsável: Josiel Lopes Valadares **Endereço:** Rua da Mantiqueira, 95 apto. 601. Bairro João Bráz, Viçosa/MG.
Telefone: (31) 31991514916.
Email: adm_josiel@yahoo.com.br

Você está recebendo uma via do presente termo que se encontra de acordo com a **Resolução CNS 466/2012**.

Em caso de discordância ou irregularidades sob o aspecto ético desta pesquisa, você poderá consultar:

CEP/UFV – Comitê de Ética em Pesquisa com Seres Humanos
Universidade Federal de Viçosa
Edifício Arthur Bernardes, piso inferior
Av. PH Rolfs, s/n – Campus Universitário
Cep: 36570-900 Viçosa/MG
Telefone: (31)3612-2316 Email: cep@ufv.br
www.cep.ufv.br

Viçosa/MG, _____ de _____ de 2020.

_____
Assinatura do Participante